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This thesis comprises two studies in the relationship between corporate firms’
financing decisions and business cycles. In the first chapter, I propose a trans-
mission mechanism linking uncertainty shocks to macroeconomic variables through
firms’ financing decisions, with an emphasis on the role of equity financing. When
uncertainty is high, equity issuance is limited, as firms are less likely to generate
positive profits, and are more tempted to divert profits. As a result, external eq-
uity financing shrinks, and this generates additional amplification since total equity
financing decreases. Based on this mechanism, I address two questions. First, how
are equity financing decisions and associated agency costs affected by uncertainty
shocks, and how does equity amplify the response of macroeconomic variables to
uncertainty shocks? I build a DSGE financial accelerator model with both debt
and equity financing that generates amplification of macroeconomic variables in re-
sponse to uncertainty shocks. The troughs of macroeconomic variables generated by
my model are approximately 30 percent deeper compared to a standard model with
only a debt contract. The amplification allows the model to predict procyclical debt
and equity financing, and countercyclical external financing costs, a combination
which existing models are unable to explain. Second, how does uncertainty affect
corporate firms’ equity financing decisions empirically? Using balance sheet data of
U.S. listed firms from 1993 to 2014, I find that a one standard deviation increase
in the level of uncertainty is associated with a 0.7 percentage point decrease in the
ratio of equity financing to total assets.
In the second chapter, we study the influence of external financial factors on
economic activity in emerging economies (EMEs), motivated by a considerable in-
crease in foreign financing by the corporate sector in EMEs since the early 2000s,
mainly in the form of bond issuance. We build a quarterly external financial indi-
cator for several EMEs using bond-level data on spreads of corporate bonds issued
in foreign capital markets, and examine its relationship with economic activity. Re-
sults show that this indicator has considerable predictive power for future economic
activity. Furthermore, an identified adverse shock to the financial indicator gener-
ates a large and protracted fall of real output growth. About a third of the forecast
error variance for output is associated with this shock. These findings are robust
to controlling for possible spillovers from sovereign to corporate risk, among other
considerations.
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Chapter 1: Uncertainty Shocks, Equity Financing, and Business Cy-
cle Amplifications
1.1 Introduction
I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where uncertainty
shocks are amplified through equity financing frictions. The key prediction of the
model is procyclical debt and equity issuance driven by countercyclical costs of debt
and equity financing. The model introduces a new transmission mechanism through
which uncertainty shocks affect firms’ external financing decisions and macroeco-
nomic variables. The financial frictions that arise from equity contracts play a
central role in the proposed transmission mechanism. The notion of uncertainty is
defined as time-varying dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity across firms (Bloom
et al., 2012, Christiano et al., 2014).
In the model, agency problems between entrepreneurs and external sharehold-
ers worsen when uncertainty increases. During uncertain times, entrepreneurs are
more likely to default and less likely to generate positive profits as lower-tail risk
increases. At the same time, entrepreneurs are more tempted to divert profits from
external shareholders as upper-tail risk increases. As a result, the agency problem
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worsens and external shareholders find investing in equity less attractive when un-
certainty is high. This limits entrepreneurs’ external equity financing as the cost of
equity financing increases. Limited equity financing has a direct effect on the size of
the balance sheet by reducing total equity. As a consequence, entrepreneurs operate
at a smaller size, and a recession ensues.
Based on this mechanism, I answer two research questions. On the theoretical
front, I study how equity financing decisions and associated agency costs are af-
fected by uncertainty shocks, and in turn, how equity frictions amplify the response
of macroeconomic variables to uncertainty shocks. In particular, I develop a small-
scale DSGE financial accelerator model that introduces financial frictions in equity
contracts to a standard debt-only model (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997). In response
to a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty, debt and equity financing de-
crease from the steady state by approximately 2% and 4% respectively. As firms
scale down, aggregate output and investment decrease by approximately 0.4% and
3%, respectively. The troughs of variables in response to uncertainty shocks are
approximately 30% deeper than in a standard financial accelerator model with only
a debt contract.
The amplification of uncertainty shocks in the model has an important impli-
cation for the cyclical properties of debt and equity along with the costs of external
financing. In particular, the model simulation generates procyclical debt and eq-
uity issuance (Covas and Den Haan, 2011), along with countercyclical costs of debt
and equity financing, all of which are consistent with empirical observations. In
contrast, existing models are unable explain the coexistence of procyclical debt and
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equity financing and countercyclical external financing costs. For example, Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) build a general equilibrium model to investigate the effect of
financial shocks, but their model predicts countercyclical equity financing, which
is inconsistent with firm-level evidence reported by Covas and Den Haan (2011).
Covas and Den Haan (2012) build a partial equilibrium model to explain procyclical
equity financing. However, their model cannot explain the coexistence of procyclical
equity financing and countercyclical costs of external financing unless they introduce
an ad-hoc assumption on countercyclical costs of equity financing.
The model’s key innovation is its explicit modeling of both debt and equity
financing decisions. I assume information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and ex-
ternal shareholders, in addition to costly state verification (CSV) (Townsend, 1979),
which is a standard debt financing friction. I introduce equity financing frictions
following La Porta et al. (2002) and Levy and Hennessy (2007). In particular, I as-
sume that the realization of productivity is entrepreneurs’ private information, and
entrepreneurs can divert profits from external shareholders by misreporting prof-
its. However, to do so they must sacrifice resources proportional to the size of the
balance sheet.
In this environment, entrepreneurs divert profits if and only if realized produc-
tivity is sufficiently high so that the size of diverted profits is greater than the cost
of diversion. As a result, as upper-tail risk increases, the more entrepreneurs are
tempted to divert profits. Since external shareholders internalize the increased prob-
ability of profit diversion, equity financing becomes more costly to entrepreneurs as
upper-tail risk increases, which limits the amount of equity financing. Equity financ-
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ing is also limited when lower-tail risk increases, because entrepreneurs less likely to
generate positive profits, so that external shareholders find investing in equity less
attractive. A symmetric increase in uncertainty implies increases in both lower- and
upper-tail risk. For this reason, the model predicts a decrease in equity financing
and an increase in costs of external financing when uncertainty is high.
Within this framework, the response of macroeconomic variables to uncer-
tainty shocks is amplified relative to a model with only debt finance. When uncer-
tainty is high, external equity financing is limited and, in turn, total equity shrinks.
This affects the size of the balance sheet both directly and indirectly, as debt fi-
nancing is further limited, since total equity determines the amount of debt that
entrepreneurs can raise.
On the empirical front, I study how firms’ equity financing decisions are related
to the level of uncertainty, using balance sheet data of U.S. listed firms from annual
Compustat for the sample period 1993-2014. Following a panel regression approach
suggested by Covas and Den Haan (2011), I find that a one standard deviation
increase in the level of uncertainty is associated with a 0.7 percentage point decrease
in the ratio of equity financing to total assets, where I measure uncertainty as time-
varying dispersion of shocks to firm-level total factor productivity.
In the next section, I discuss related literature and how my work contributes.
In Section 1.3, I introduce debt and equity contracts in a partial equilibrium setting.
In Section 1.4, I embed the partial equilibrium financial contract into a DSGE
model. Section 1.5 presents numerical results of the DSGE model. Section 1.6
presents empirical evidence on the cyclicality of equity financing in the context of
4
uncertainty shocks. The final section concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
A wide literature has examined the potential importance of uncertainty shocks
as a driver of U.S. business cycles. Among the various channels through which
uncertainty affects the macroeconomy, many studies highlight the role of financial
frictions. However, these studies mainly focus on debt contracts, and abstract from
equity financing frictions.
In contrast, there is a long tradition in the corporate finance literature in
which equity financing is not simply a sideshow, for example Myers and Majluf
(1984). This literature departs from Modigliani and Miller (1958), in that firms’
choice between debt and equity financing has real implications, because it affects
the firms’ investment decisions.
My research contributes to both strands of the literature. First, I contribute
to the literature that studies how uncertainty shocks are transmitted to the econ-
omy. Bloom (2009) finds that uncertainty shocks can generate a recession, as firms
delay investment until uncertainty is resolved. While Bloom (2009) highlights the
“wait-and-see” channel, another line of literature investigates the transmission of
uncertainty shocks through financial frictions. For example, Gilchrist et al. (2014)
provide evidence that debt frictions play a substantial role in the transmission of
uncertainty shocks, and build a DSGE model that is consistent with their empirical
findings. In a similar vein, Christiano et al. (2014) estimate a large-scale financial
5
accelerator model with debt contracts and idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks and con-
firm the significant role of uncertainty shocks in the U.S. business cycle.1 In this
class of models, the default rate increases as uncertainty increases. As a result,
debt financing is limited and firms become smaller. Through this channel, adverse
uncertainty shocks generate recessions.
However, these studies typically abstract from equity financing. I add to the
literature by embedding both debt and equity contracts into the model. Allowing
for equity contracts is important, as my model generates a larger amplification of
macroeconomic variables to uncertainty shocks compared to models with only debt
contracts.
Secondly, I contribute to the literature on the cyclicality of debt and equity
financing. For example, Jermann and Quadrini (2006, 2012) document countercycli-
cal equity financing using Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board, and
build a model with both debt and equity financing to study how financial shocks gen-
erate business cycles. Their model predicts countercyclical equity financing, which
is inconsistent with studies of firm-level data such as Covas and Den Haan (2011,
2012). The latter document that both debt and equity financing are procyclical for
listed U.S. firms in all size classes except for the top 1% firms by asset size, where
smaller firms have stronger procyclicality. Covas and Den Haan (2012) develop a
partial equilibrium model in which firms finance investment with both debt and
equity. In their model, firms scale up their business in response to positive produc-
1Similarly Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo (2015) build a DSGE model with both macro-
level uncertainty (time-varying second moment of TFP shocks) and micro-level uncertainty (time-
varying dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity) and show that micro-level uncertainty shocks
generate a recession through financial market frictions.
6
tivity shocks. However, since debt financing increases the likelihood of default, firms
have an incentive to issue equity to avoid excessive leverage when they issue debt.2
Although their model predicts both procyclical debt and equity financing, it fails to
predict countercyclical real borrowing costs and a countercyclical default rate unless
countercyclical equity financing costs are assumed. They introduce countercyclical
equity financing costs into the model by simply assuming an ad-hoc functional rela-
tionship between productivity and equity financing costs without a microfoundation.
In contrast, my framework predicts procyclical debt and equity financing along
with endogenous countercyclical external financing costs, all of which are consistent
with the data. Under the CSV framework, agency costs decrease when the level
of TFP decreases since firms scale down and need less external financing. While
adverse uncertainty shocks partly offset this effect by increasing agency costs, the
effect of adverse uncertainty shocks is not large enough to generate countercyclical
agency costs, if only a debt contract is considered. However, in my model with
both debt and equity contracts, the effect of uncertainty shocks on the cyclicality of
financing frictions dominates the effect of TFP level shocks, as equity financing fric-
tions amplify uncertainty shocks. So, the model is able to generate both procyclical
debt and equity financing, a countercyclical default rate and countercyclical cost of
debt and equity finance.
2Begenau and Salomao (2015) build a heterogenous agent general equilibrium model to simul-
taneously explain procyclical equity financing of small firms and coutercyclicality of the largest
firms. Small firms issue debt and equity procyclically for a similar reason as in Covas and Den Haan
(2012). However, the largest firms find debt financing much cheaper during the expansion, since
they are already close to the efficient scale of production, and thus the impact of having an ad-
ditional unit of debt on the default probability is low. As a result, they replace equity with debt
during expansions to take an advantage of a tax benefit on debt over equity.
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My empirical finding that equity financing is negatively correlated with uncer-
tainty is related to existing empirical studies of the patterns and cyclicality of debt
and equity financing. Fama and French (2005) document that equity financing is
common among listed firms in the U.S. Covas and Den Haan (2011, 2012) show that
both debt and equity financing are procyclical for listed U.S. firms in all size classes
except for the top 1% of firms by asset size, where smaller firms have stronger pro-
cyclicality. Erel et al. (2012) document a similar pattern. They find that seasoned
equity offerings (SEO) decrease during NBER-defined recessions, which is a pattern
largely driven by noninvestment-grade firms. They also find that bond financing is
procyclical, which is also largely driven by noninvestment-grade firms. I add to this
literature by investigating cyclical patterns of debt and equity finance in response
to changes in uncertainty. I provide empirical evidence that debt and equity financ-
ing decreases during periods of high uncertainty, and build a DSGE model that is
consistent with empirical evidence.
1.3 Financial Contracts
In this section, I build a theoretical model with both debt and equity con-
tracts that predicts a decrease in debt and equity financing in response to increased
uncertainty. I first discuss the financial contract among entrepreneurs, lenders, and
external shareholders in a partial equilibrium setting. The partial equilibrium anal-
ysis will be extended to a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in Section
1.4.
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I model the debt contract as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), who introduce
debt financing frictions into a computationally tractable general equilibrium model.
The main friction in the debt contract arises from an information asymmetry be-
tween lenders and borrowers. Following Townsend (1979), lenders must pay a mon-
itoring cost in order to verify the true productivity of borrowers (Costly State Ver-
ification, CSV). However their model abstracts from equity financing. I introduce
equity financing frictions into Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) by assuming that en-
trepreneurs can divert profits at some cost, following La Porta et al. (2002) and
Levy and Hennessy (2007).
Three types of agents participate in the financial contract: entrepreneurs,
lenders, and external shareholders. I assume that all contract parties are risk neu-
tral, and only care about expected returns. Entrepreneurs, who operate capital
good producing firms, have access to a stochastic constant-returns-to-scale capi-
tal production technology which transforms consumption goods into capital goods.
Entrepreneurs finance their investment projects prior to the realization of idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks using debt and external equity, along with internal equity.
Most of the financial accelerator literature abstracts from external equity and uses
the term ‘net worth’ to refer to both total equity and internal equity. However,
there is a clear distinction between internal and external equity in this paper. To
avoid confusion, I use the term internal equity instead of net worth to refer to the
funds that entrepreneurs put into the contract. After the realization of idiosyncratic
productivity, entrepreneurs can potentially either default on debt or divert profits.
In case of debt default, lenders pay a monitoring cost to verify the realized idiosyn-
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cratic shock and take all the output from entrepreneurs. In case of profit diversion,
entrepreneurs first repay principal and interest on debt. However, instead of paying
all remaining profits to external shareholders, entrepreneurs take a fraction of the
profit which should belong to external shareholders. To divert profits entrepreneurs
must sacrifice a certain amount of capital goods, which is proportional to the size
of the balance sheet.
There are two sources of aggregate risk in the economy: total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) shocks, and uncertainty shocks. TPF shocks are standard as in real
business cycle models. Uncertainty shocks refer to a stochastic time-varying dis-
persion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Aggregate shocks are realized at the
beginning of the period. All financial contracts are intra-temporal, and thus there
is no aggregate shock realized for the duration of the contract. As a result all par-
ties take the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks parametrically. This
assumption further allows us to analyze the model first in partial equilibrium, and
then in a dynamic general equilibrium setting.
Lenders and external shareholders can be thought of as financial institutions
that channel funds from households (which I will discuss when I describe the DSGE
model) to entrepreneurs who produce capital goods. The economy is populated
with numerous infinitesimal lenders and external shareholders that specialize ei-
ther in debt or equity. Each financial institution pools deposits from households
and lends to or buys shares of numerous infinitesimal entrepreneurs. This allows
financial institutions to diversify idiosyncratic risks, and guarantee a fixed return to
households.
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1.3.1 Setup of Debt and Equity Contracts
I now, analyze debt and equity contracts in a partial equilibrium setting. An
entrepreneur i has access to a stochastic constant returns to scale technology ωiii,
which transforms ii units of consumption goods into ωiii units of capital goods, tak-
ing the price of capital q as given.3 The consumption good is the numeraire, and the
price of capital will be endogenously determined in general equilibrium. ωi denotes






iosyncratic productivity shocks are independently and identically distributed across
entrepreneurs in each period. φ(ω) and Φ(ω) denote the p.d.f and c.d.f of ωi re-
spectively. The modeling of uncertainty closely follows Christiano et al. (2014).
Uncertainty shocks are embedded into the model by assuming that the dispersion of
idiosyncratic productivity shocks σω is a time-varying stochastic variable. However,
σω does not vary within the duration of financial contracts. For this reason, contract
participants take σω parametrically in a partial equilibrium setting. Since contracts
are intra-period, I suppress time subscript t for notational simplicity.
An entrepreneur has three different sources for financing their investment
project ii. The investment project requires consumption goods. The first option
is to finance with internal equity ni. For now, I assume that ni is exogenously
fixed for the duration of the contract. In general equilibrium, ni is determined en-
dogenously as a result of entrepreneurs’ capital accumulation decisions. The second
3From now on, I use entrepreneurs and capital good producing firms interchangeably depending
on context.
4This implies E(ωi) = 1.
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option is to issue debt securities di = ii − ei − ni, where ei denotes the third source
of financing, which is external equity. The size of the project ii also represents the
size of the balance sheet of a capital good producing firm, which consists of debt
and total equity, the latter of which in turn is a sum of internal and external equity.5
I limit my interest to the case where the optimal size of project ii is greater
than internal equity ni so that all firms must rely on external financing to some
degree. Entrepreneurs borrow di before idiosyncratic productivity is realized and
promise to return (1 + rd)di units of capital goods to lenders once idiosyncratic
productivity is realized and production is taken. After they observe the realization
of idiosyncratic productivity, capital good producing firms can default on debt. The
realization of idiosyncratic productivity is the entrepreneur’s private information.
Due to the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, lenders have to
sacrifice µii units of capital goods to verify the firm’s reports in case of default.
This is a CSV framework as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). After lenders pay the
monitoring cost, they seize ωiii, which will in equilibrium be less than the sum of
principal and interest.
The other source of external financing is outside equity ei raised from exter-
nal shareholders. Entrepreneurs raise equity before the realization of idiosyncratic
productivity, and promise to return the fraction si ∈ [0, 1] of the profit (in capital
good units) to shareholders as dividends once idiosyncratic productivity is realized.
However entrepreneurs can divert profits at a cost proportional to the size of the
5From now on, I use the size of the project and the size of the balance sheet interchangeably
depending on context.
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balance sheet, γii. The greater is γ, the more costly it is for entrepreneurs to di-
vert profits since they sacrifice a larger fraction of their balance sheet in case of
diversion. Thus, a higher γ represents an economy with better outside investor
protection. If profit diversion occurs, entrepreneurs repay their debt to lenders
and take a fraction φ of the portion of profits promised to shareholders, plus all
of the profits promised to themselves, net of diversion costs. φ is parametrically
given and measures the degree of investor protection together with γ. The higher
is φ, the more entrepreneurs can divert from external shareholders as the degree
of investor protection is low. The return to entrepreneurs under diversion thus
equals (1 − si) [ωiii − (1 + rd)di] + φsi [ωiii − (1 + rd)di] − γii. Note that due to
the information asymmetry, external shareholders cannot verify the realized value
of idiosyncratic productivity. By assumption, they do not have access to a CSV
technology. The friction embedded in the equity contract is taken from La Porta
et al. (2002) and Levy and Hennessy (2007). In practice, profit diversion can occur
in various forms both legally and illegally. For example, entrepreneurs might reward
themselves with excessively large salaries, or install unqualified family members in
managerial positions. They could also divert profits by benefiting outside entities
controlled by the entrepreneurs, for example, by providing better terms of contract
or by transferring assets. In the worst case, entrepreneurs can simply steal profits.
In this regard, entrepreneurs in my model represent any type of manager, control-
ling shareholder, and/or board member who owns a share of the firm’s assets, and
at the same time actively engages in the firm’s managerial decisions. See Johnson
et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (2000) for an extensive list of profit diversions that
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could occur in practice.
Lastly, note that financing decisions are made prior to the realization of id-
iosyncratic productivity shocks. As a result, adverse selection is not present in this
environment. For example, it will not be the case that firms intending to divert
funds are the only firms active in the equity market.
1.3.2 Debt Default and Asset Diversion Thresholds
The next step is to find the productivity thresholds for default and diversion.
Entrepreneurs default on debt only if they cannot repay promised returns to lenders.
There is no incentive to default when realized output is greater than the sum of the
principal and interest, because lenders can recoup their claims in this case. Therefore
firms default if and only if the realized shock ωi satisfies ωiii < (1 + rd)di. Thus, the





(1 + rd)(ii − ei − ni)
ii
For any given level of external equity ei and internal equity ni, once capital good
producing firms decide on the debt default threshold ω̄i and the size of project ii,
the corresponding interest rate rd is determined by (1 + rd) =
ω̄iii
(ii−ei−ni) . Also note
that the share si of profits promised to external shareholders does not affect the
properties of the debt contract, because shares are residual claims.
Meanwhile entrepreneurs divert profits if and only if the payoff from diversion
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is greater than the payoff from honoring the equity contract. Therefore entrepreneurs
divert profits when the realized shock satisfies
(1− si) [ωiii − (1 + rd)di] < (1− si) [ωiii − (1 + rd)di]
+φsi [ωiii − (1 + rd)di)]− γii.
The right-hand side of the inequality denotes the payoff in case of diversion while
the left-hand side denotes the payoff in case of honoring the equity contract. By
replacing (1 + rd)di on both sides with ω̄iii, as derived, this inequality simplifies to




The right-hand side of this inequality defines the profit diversion threshold produc-
tivity ω̂i ≡ ω̄i+ γφsi . Entrepreneurs divert profits when the realized shock is above ω̂i.
First, note that ω̂i is an increasing function of γ, the diversion cost, and a decreasing
function of φ, the share of profits the firm can divert. These results are straight for-
ward. Also, ω̂i is increasing in the fraction of external shares, si. A higher fraction
of external shares implies that entrepreneurs are only entitled to a small fraction of
the profit. In such case, entrepreneurs are more willing to engage in diversion so
that they can seize the portion that otherwise belongs to the external shareholders.
Second, profit diversion occurs only when the realization of ωi is sufficiently large.
This result is intuitive, since profit diversion is not optimal if entrepreneurs receive
nothing after paying the cost of diversion. This result is consistent with Levy and
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Hennessy (2007), whose model predicts a stronger incentive for diversion when the
realized profits are sufficiently large. Third, the ratio between γ and φ (along with
si) is sufficient to determine the profit diversion threshold. Considering that both
parameters measure the degree of investor protection, having both parameters sep-
arately might seem redundant. However, each parameter plays a unique role in the
model. γ affects the amount of deadweight loss due to diversion, and directly affects
entrepreneurs’ payoff. Meanwhile, external shareholders’ payoff is directly affected
by the level of φ. Finally, note that ω̂i > ω̄i. This implies capital good producing
firms do not have any incentive to default when they conduct diversion. This is
obvious because if there is no profit, there are no resources to divide.
1.3.3 Equilibrium Contract
Since entrepreneurs, lenders, and shareholders are risk neutral during the fi-
nancial contract period, the expected payoff is the only concern to each party. In
this environment, entrepreneurs will choose (ω̄i, ii, ei, si) so that their expected
payoff is maximized, subject to both lenders and shareholders earning an expected
gross return of one. Considering that the financial contracts are intra-period, an ex-
pected gross return of one is sufficient to ensure lenders’ and external shareholders’
participation.
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Entrepreneurs’ expected payoff from participating in the contract is
Expected Payoff (entrepreneur) =
∫ ω̂
ω̄




{(1− s) [ωi− (1 + rd)(i− e− n)]




(1− s) [ωi− ω̄i] Φ(dω) +
∫ ∞
ω̂




(1− s) [ω − ω̄] Φ(dω) +
∫ ∞
ω̂
{φs [ω − ω̄]− γ}Φ(dω)
]
= i× A(ω̄, s)
where A(ω̄, s) ≡
∫∞
ω̄




(ω − ω̄ − γ) Φ(dω) denotes the
expected share of output (in terms of capital good units) paid to entrepreneurs.6
The first term of the first line of the equation denotes entrepreneurs’ expected payoff
when paying dividends to external shareholders truthfully, while the second and the
third terms show the expected payoff to entrepreneurs in case of profit diversion.
The expected payoff to lenders is
Expected Payoff (lender) =
∫ ω̄
0








ωΦ(dω)− Φ(ω̄)µ+ [1− Φ(ω̄)] ω̄
]
= i×B(ω̄, s)
where B(ω̄, s) ≡
∫ ω̄
0
ωΦ(dω) − Φ(ω̄)µ + [1− Φ(ω̄)] ω̄ denotes the expected share
6I drop subscript i for notational simplicity.
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of output (in terms of capital good units) paid to lenders. The first two terms of
the first line of the equation denote lenders’ expected payoff when firms default on
debt while the last term shows the payoff when firms experience sufficiently large
productivity that they repay lenders in full. Note that equity share s is not present
in the expression B(ω̄, s). Since lenders are always repaid with highest priority, s
does not directly affect the share of output that lenders will receive. However, s
does affect the expected share of output paid to lenders indirectly, since there is an
interdependence between ω̄ and s.
Similarly, external shareholders’ expected payoff is
Expected Payoff (shareholder) =
∫ ∞
ω̄








s [ωi− ω̄i] Φ(dω)−
∫ ∞
ω̂




s [ω − ω̄] Φ(dω)−
∫ ∞
ω̂
φs [ω − ω̄] Φ(dω)
]
= i× C(ω̄, s)
where C(ω̄, s) ≡
∫∞
ω̄




φs [ω − ω̄] Φ(dω) denotes the expected
share of output (in terms of capital good units) paid to shareholders.
The sum of the expected shares paid to each party is given by






















where the second term denotes the expected loss due to the monitoring cost, and
the third term denotes the expected loss due to the diversion cost. Note that the
expected shares paid to each party do not add up to 1, because output may be lost
due to costly monitoring or diversion.
Given these expressions for the expected payoffs to each party, the contract
problem is defined as
max
ω̄,s,i,e
qiA(ω̄, s) subject to qiB(ω̄, s) = i− e− n
qiC(ω̄, s) = e
where q is the price of capital goods. Entrepreneurs maximize their expected payoff
in consumption goods units by optimally choosing (ω̄, s, i, e). The entrepreneurs’
objective function is expressed in terms of consumption goods, since entrepreneurs
utility depends on consumption in the general equilibrium model presented in Sec-
tion 1.4. Furthermore lenders participate in the contract only if they recoup the
resources they lend in expectation, and external shareholders accept the equity con-
tract only if they receive expected returns at least as large as the amount of external
equity they provide to entrepreneurs. Note that the price of capital good q appears
on the left-hand side of both constraints but not on the right-hand side, since both
debt and equity are raised in consumption goods, and entrepreneurs pay back in
capital goods. Obviously both constraints bind with equality at an optimum. From
entrepreneurs’ perspective, for a given level of external financing (d and e), en-
trepreneurs want to minimize the fractions of output paid to lenders (B(ω̄, s)) and
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to shareholders (C(ω̄, s)) so that firms can receive a higher fraction of the output.
Note that I make a simplifying assumption that debt and equity investors’
behavior is passive. Debt and equity investors are not making an optimal portfolio
decision between debt and equity. Instead, equity investors commit to invest only in
equity but not in debt, and vice versa for debt investors. In this regard, the contract
is optimal only from firms’ perspective, and the optimal contract might be different
in an environment where investors make an optimal portfolio decision between debt
and equity.



















1− q(B + C)
n (1.4)
where A1, B1, and C1 denote partial derivatives of A, B, and C with respect to ω̄,
while A2, B2 and C2 denote partial derivatives with respect to s. The interpretation
of these optimality conditions is similar to that of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
For completeness, I repeat their interpretation. The first important observation is
that for any given price of capital q, equations (1.1) and (1.2) pin down ω̄ and s.
Also, note that the optimal ω̄ and s depend implicitly on q, but are independent
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of the level of internal equity. As a result, all entrepreneurs have identical s and
ω̄, and thus the expected shares paid to each party A(ω, s), B(ω, s), and C(ω, s)
are identical across entrepreneurs. Substituting this result into equations (1.3) and
(1.4), the size of the project i and external equity e are defined as functions of q
and n. Rewriting the solution of equation (1.3) as i(q, n), and aggregating ωi(q, n)
across entrepreneurs, the law of large numbers implies an aggregate investment












n is an average (or aggregate) of individual internal equity across entrepreneurs,
with a slight abuse of notation. Thus aggregate investment is a function solely of
the economy-wide capital price q, and aggregate internal equity n. The linearity of
the firms’ balance sheet in internal equity is a direct consequence of the assumption
that the costs of state verification and profit diversion are linear in the size of project
i. Without linearity, the computational burden would increase substantially once
the partial equilibrium contract is embedded into a DSGE setting, since it would be
necessary to track the distribution of internal equity to solve the model.
The second important observation concerns the expected return on internal
saving qAi
n
. Replacing i with equation (1.3), qAi
n
is equal to qA
1−q(B+C) . This term
is important in understanding the evolution of entrepreneurs’ internal equity in a
DSGE setting. In the absence of financial frictions, the expected return on internal
saving is always equal to one, which implies that returns on debt, external equity and
internal equity are identical.7 Consistent with the Modigliani-Miller theorem, this
7q is greater than 1 in equilibrium if financial frictions are present. This essentially reflects
a compensation to contractual parties for participating in debt and equity contracts which incur
deadweight loss. As a result q = 1 in the absence of financial frictions. At the same time A+B+C =
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further implies that the financing method is irrelevant to entrepreneurs. However,
as long as financial frictions are present, there is a deadweight loss from external
financing due to the costly state verification and profit diversion. Since lenders,
external shareholders, and entrepreneurs internalize the loss, the expected return
on internal saving is always greater than one, and from the above expression for qAi
n
the size of the expected return depends on the level of debt and external equity.8
As a result financial structure does matter, and this incentivizes entrepreneurs to
adjust internal equity accordingly over time in the DSGE model discussed in Section
1.4.
Lastly, entrepreneurs rely on both debt and external equity in equilibrium. In
other words, it is not optimal for entrepreneurs to use a single source of external fi-
nance. Consider an entrepreneur who finances completely through debt. Intuitively,
marginally increasing external equity barely affects the probability of diversion. This
implies that external shareholders will not ask for a high premium for buying shares.
As a result entrepreneurs will replace debt with equity. Now, consider the opposite
case where entrepreneurs finance their project entirely with equity. In this case,
marginally increasing debt barely increases the default probability, and this implies
a low real borrowing cost. As a result entrepreneurs will replace equity with debt.
1 without financial frictions. Substituting q = 1 and A = 1 − (B + C) into qA1−q(B+C) yields
qA
1−q(B+C) = 1.
8Note that A, B, and C are functions of s and ω̄, and equations (1.1)-(1.4) pin down ω̄, s, i,
and e.
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1.3.4 Outcome of Financial Contracts
In this section, I present numerical results on the effect of changes in uncer-
tainty on financial contracts in a partial equilibrium setting. In this case, in a partial
equilibrium setting, contract parties take the capital price q and internal equity n
as fixed. I conduct a comparative statics exercise by changing the value of the dis-
persion of idiosyncratic productivity σω while holding the capital price q and other
parameters fixed, for a given level of internal net worth n. Parameter values used
in this exercise are reported under the heading “Financial Friction” in Table 1.1.
They are chosen based on a calibration of the DSGE model, which will be discussed
in Section 1.4.
Figure 1.1 shows changes in the levels of balance sheet variables for different
values of σω. Solid lines represent percentage deviations from the contract out-
come under a baseline parameterization (with dispersion of idiosyncratic productiv-
ity σω = 0.2466) when both debt and equity contract frictions are present. If the
level of uncertainty increases (higher values of σω), entrepreneurs raise less external
equity as shown in the top-left panel of Figure 1.1. This result is consistent with
empirical evidence, reported in Section 1.6, that increased uncertainty is associated
with a decrease in equity financing. Furthermore, entrepreneurs scale down the level
of debt (top-right panel of Figure 1.1) in response to increased uncertainty. As a
consequence, the size of the project shrinks (bottom-left panel of Figure 1.1).
What is the underlying mechanism that drives firms to lower both debt and



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.1: Partial Equilibrium Analysis - Changes in σω
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Notes: The figure shows partial equilibrium contract outcomes for different values of σω. All values
are percentage deviations from the contract outcomes calculated at the baseline parameterization
(σω = 0.2466). Solid lines are contractual outcomes from the debt-equity model. Dashed lines are
contractual outcomes from the debt-only model. See Table 1.1 for values of other parameters.
increases, the probability of default increases for any given level of total equity. As
a result, lenders find debt securities less attractive, and the lenders’ demand for
debt decreases. Entrepreneurs find debt financing more expensive since they must
compensate lenders for bearing a higher default probability. As a consequence, debt
financing decreases in equilibrium.
The model predicts a decrease in equity financing when uncertainty increases,
for two reasons. First, for any given level of internal equity n, external equity e,
and debt d, the probability of default increases as the level of uncertainty increases,
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since lower tail risk increases. This implies that it is less likely for entrepreneurs to
generate positive profits and dividends. From the external shareholders’ perspec-
tive, investing in equity becomes less attractive, and as a consequence, shareholders
demand equity less. Second, investing in equity is less attractive due to increased up-
per tail risk. As discussed in the previous section, entrepreneurs are more tempted
to divert profits if the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity shock is high.
Internalizing the increased chance of profit diversion, shareholders demand equity
less. As a result, equity financing decreases in equilibrium. The bottom-right panel
of Figure 1.1 shows how external equity per share, or equivalently the price of stock
(e/s), varies for different values of σω. It is clear that equity financing becomes more
expensive from entrepreneurs’ perspective when uncertainty increases, which limits
the amount of equity that entrepreneurs can raise.
Answering how firms’ capital structure and financing decisions vary in response
to uncertainty is itself an important question in corporate finance. However, we are
also interested in the macroeconomic consequences of increased uncertainty when
equity financing is explicitly taken into account. The most important macroeco-
nomic implication of the model is an amplification of uncertainty shocks through
the equity financing friction. The amplification of uncertainty arising from equity
financing frictions can be shown by comparing contract outcomes in the model with
both debt and equity (hereafter the debt-equity model), and the model with only
debt (hereafter the debt-only model).
The dashed lines in Figure 1.1 represent percentage deviations from the con-
tract outcome under a baseline parameterization (σω = 0.2466) of the debt-only
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model, which is exactly identical to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).9 As the bottom-
left panel of Figure 1.1 shows, the size of the balance sheet responds more to un-
certainty in the debt-equity model than in the debt-only model. The amplification
arises mainly from the fact that total equity includes both internal equity and ex-
ternal equity in the debt-equity model, but only internal equity in the debt-only
model. Since external equity decreases as a result of increased uncertainty, total
equity shrinks in the debt-equity model. However, total equity remains constant in
the debt-only model. In addition, since total equity determines the debt capacity,
shrinking total equity further limits debt financing in the debt-equity model. As the
top-right panel of Figure 1.1 suggests, debt financing shrinks more in the debt-equity
model when uncertainty increases.
In a general equilibrium setting, internal equity will vary over time in both
models, as entrepreneurs adjust internal savings, which form the internal equity of
following periods. However, since the debt-equity model has the additional margin
of external equity financing, total equity is expected to exhibit larger fluctuations
in response to uncertainty shocks in following periods as well.
De Fiore and Uhlig (2011, 2015) investigate the role of bond and bank loan
financing over the business cycle. They show that an economy with a well-developed
bond market (along with a bank loan market) is less vulnerable to adverse shocks
than an economy heavily dependent on the bank loan market (with a less developed
bond market), since firms can substitute one from the other in response to shocks. In
9An alternative way to shut down equity financing is to set γ → 0, so that profit diversion is
virtually costless. In this case, entrepreneurs will always divert profits regardless of the size of
profit. Since shareholders internalize the fact that profit diversion always occurs, they will never
invest in equity. As a result, the equity market collapses.
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contrast, my model predicts that having an additional source of external financing
amplifies shocks. The different prediction is mainly due to the complementarity
between debt and equity. The amount of equity determines the amount of debt
a firm can raise in my model. However, there is no such relationship between
bank loans and bond financing in De Fiore and Uhlig (2011, 2015), who focus on
substitutability between the two types of debt instruments.
1.4 General Equilibrium Analysis
1.4.1 Setup of the Model
In this section, I embed the partial equilibrium financial contract into a dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium model. The main goal of this section is to
investigate the dynamic effects of uncertainty shocks on financing decisions and
macroeconomic outcomes. In contrast to the partial equilibrium analysis, the price
of capital goods q and internal equity n are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
The model closely follows Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The major differences are
introducing the equity contract and uncertainty shocks, in the form of a time-varying
stochastic dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity.
The economy is populated with a unit mass continuum of economic agents.
There are two types of agents in the model: households with fraction 1 − η and
entrepreneurs with fraction η. Households are standard as in conventional real
business cycle models. However, entrepreneurs are non-trivial. They have an access
to a stochastic technology which transforms consumption goods into capital goods.
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The role of entrepreneurs is critical in the model since entrepreneurs are subject to
financial frictions when they finance input costs of capital production. Entrepreneurs
finance input costs through financial institutions that pool households’ funds and
invest in debt and equity. Consumption good producing firms are standard. They
take labor and capital as inputs and are not subject to financial frictions.
Households are infinitely-lived and risk averse. They maximize expected life-
time utility by optimally choosing consumption cht and leisure lt where the time
endowment is normalized to unity. They discount the future utility with time pref-
erence parameter β ∈ (0, 1). Since there is no heterogeneity across households, I
study a representative household hereafter. Households accumulate physical capital
kht , which earns gross interest 1 + rt and depreciates at the rate δ in the following
period. They also earn wage income by supplying labor to consumption good pro-
ducing firms, at a wage rate wt. They purchase consumption goods at a price of
unity (the consumption good is the numeraire), and they also purchase new capital
goods at the end of the period at a price of qt. The representative household’s utility








cht , 1− ht
)
subject to
cht + qtkt+1 5 wtht + rtkt + qt(1− δ)kt.







qtuc(t) = βE [uc(t+ 1) {rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)}] . (1.6)
Identical consumption good producing firms owned by households have access to a
constant-returns-to-scale technology given by Yt = θtF (Kt, Ht, H
e
t ). They produce
consumption goods Yt taking the aggregate capital stock Kt, aggregate household
labor Ht, and aggregate entrepreneurial labor H
e
t as inputs. The technology is sub-
ject to aggregate TFP shocks θt, realized at the beginning of period t. Consumption
good producing firms are price takers in both input and output markets. Solving
their profit maximization problem yields standard capital, household labor, and




In the baseline calibration (see Section 1.4.3 and Table 1.1), entrepreneurial labor
plays a minimal role in the consumption good production process. However, it is
important to include entrepreneurial labor since it allows entrepreneurs to start a
new business with non-zero internal equity in case of default. If entrepreneurial
labor is not included, entrepreneurs start a new business with zero internal equity
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in case of default. Debt and equity contracts are not well defined if entrepreneurs
participate in the contract with zero internal equity.
Entrepreneurs indexed by i are infinitely-lived and risk-neutral. They max-
imize expected lifetime utility by optimally choosing consumption cei,t and capital
zi,t+1. They discount future consumption with a time discount factor ξβ where
ξ ∈ (0, 1). Note that entrepreneurs discount the future more than households. This
assumption is necessary, since entrepreneurs will otherwise accumulate capital up
to the point where self-financing is enough to cover the entire investment project;
financial frictions would not play any role in this case. Entrepreneurs form internal
equity in two different ways. First, they supply one unit of labor inelastically, and
earn wage income. Secondly, they earn returns on the capital stock carried over
from the previous period, in the form of consumption goods that can be used as an




t + zi,t (qt(1− δ) + rt) ,
which clearly shows that internal equity ni,t is endogenously determined by en-
trepreneurs’ capital accumulation decisions on zi,t in the previous period, in con-
trast to the partial equilibrium analysis where entrepreneurs take ni,t as given and
fixed. Given internal equity, entrepreneurs tap financial institutions to finance the
remaining costs of their investment project ii,t with debt and equity. Since the
uncertainty shock is realized at the beginning of period t, the realization of the
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dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity σω,t is common knowledge across all parties
when financial contracts are made. In the presence of financial frictions in debt
and equity contracts, and as long as entrepreneurs rely on external financing to
some degree, the return on internal saving (or internal equity) is always greater
than the return on external financing. This result, together with entrepreneurs’
risk-neutrality, implies that entrepreneurs commit all of their internal equity to the
project. Other details of financial contracts are identical to those in the previous
section. To avoid complexity, the model abstracts from the possibility of dynamic
or repeated contracts. In other words, entrepreneurs make contracts with differ-
ent lenders and external shareholders each period. Once debt and equity contracts
are made, the entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic productivity shocks are realized, and en-
trepreneurs make debt default and profit diversion decisions. Solvent entrepreneurs
divide returns from their project into consumption and physical capital accumula-
tion, which forms the basis of internal equity in the following period. In case of
default, entrepreneurs consume zero units of the consumption good, and start a
new business in the following period with an initial level of internal equity built by
supplying a single unit of labor. Entrepreneurs that divert profits behave as solvent
firms.









cei,t + qtzi,t+1 5 qtii,tÃi,t (1.7)
ii,t =
1




t + zi,t (qt (1− δ) + rt) (1.9)
where Ãi,t is the realized fraction of output belonging to an individual entrepreneur.
Bt and Ct are the expected share of output paid to lenders and external share-






(qt+1(1− δ) + rt+1)
qt+1At+1
1− qt+1 (Bt+1 + Ct+1)
}]
. (1.10)
As discussed in the previous section, qt+1At+1
1−qt+1(Bt+1+Ct+1) is the expected return on in-
ternal saving. As long as financial frictions are present and entrepreneurs finance
externally, this term is greater than one. Comparing equation (1.6) and (1.10), it
is clear that entrepreneurs have a stronger incentive to accumulate physical capital
(which, in turn, will become next period’s internal equity) than households for a
given discount rate. If entrepreneurs have the same discount factor as households,
they will eventually accumulate enough physical capital that they can finance invest-
ment solely with internal equity. To avoid this outcome, I assume that entrepreneurs
have an additional discount factor ξ. Another important observation is that the level
of internal equity does not affect the above Euler equation, which is a direct conse-
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quence of the linearity assumption; entrepreneurs have access to a CRS technology,
and the monitoring and diversion costs are linear in the size of the project ii,t. The
entrepreneur subscript i does not appear in the entrepreneurs’ Euler equation (re-
call that contract terms ω̄ and s are identical across entrepreneurs regardless of the
level of internal equity, as shown in section 1.3.3). This allows me to analyze the
aggregate economy without tracking the distribution of individual entrepreneurs’
internal equity, which reduces the computational burden substantially. Lastly, note
that Ãi,t in equation (1.7) denotes the realized fraction of output belonging to an
individual entrepreneur. However, it is not necessary to track Ãi,t of each individual
entrepreneur, since aggregation of entrepreneurs’ budget constraint across individu-
als (along with equation (1.8) and (1.9)) yields the following aggregate entrepreneur
budget constraint:
cet + qtzt+1 = qtitAt, (1.11)
where Ãi,t in equation (1.7) is replaced by At, which by the law of large numbers
is the expected share of output paid to the entrepreneur, defined as in Section
1.3.3. Note that there is no entrepreneur subscript i in equation (1.11) due to
aggregation. It is possible to further drop subscript i in equations (1.8) and (1.9)
after aggregation across entrepreneurs, and to track only aggregate variables.10 Since
the main interest is in the average behavior of agents and aggregate fluctuations, I
abstract from subscript i from now on.
10To be more precise, one can compute averages by summing across entrepreneurs, then dividing
by entrepreneurial mass η.
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The role of financial institutions in this model is to channel funds (in con-
sumption goods) from households to entrepreneurs, and to relay capital goods from
entrepreneurs to households who want to purchase capital goods (recall that en-
trepreneurs repay in capital goods to financial institutions). In addition, financial
institutions pay households a non-stochastic return from investing in equity and
debt, by pooling funds from each household. Since financial institutions invest in
the debt and equity of an infinite number of entrepreneurs, they can effectively di-
versify the risk arising from idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In particular, since
there is no aggregate shock realized for the duration of the contract, households
receive a gross return of 1 in terms of consumption goods from financial institu-
tions each period regardless of the realized value of uncertainty shocks. However,
the time-varying dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is an aggregate risk,
and generates business cycles. Uncertainty shocks are aggregate shocks since they
affect the terms of debt and equity contracts that all entrepreneurs face. As a result
uncertainty shocks do generate aggregate fluctuations regardless of diversification,
as the level of debt and equity financing of all entrepreneurs is affected by changes in
the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, although households still receive
a non-stochastic return.
Market clearing conditions for the two labor markets, the consumption goods
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market, and the capital goods market are given by
Ht = (1− η)ht
Het = η
(1− η)ct + ηcet + ηit = θtF (Kt, Ht, Het )
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ηit [1− Φ(ω̄)µ− (1− Φ (ω̂)) γ]
where Kt+1 = (1− η)kt+1 + ηzt+1 and ω̂ = ω̄ + γφst .
Lastly, I specify laws of motion for aggregate shocks as follows:
log(σω,t) = (1− ρσω)log(σω,ss) + ρσω log(σω,t−1) + εσω,t (1.12)





and εσω ∼ (0, σ2θ).
1.4.2 Definition of Competitive Equilibrium of DSGE Model
A competitive equilibrium is a vector of variables:{
ω̄t, st, it, et, c
h
t , ht, kt+1, c
e
t , zt+1, nt, wt, w
e
t , rt, qt, H
e









qtuc(t) = βE [uc(t+ 1) {rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)}]





(qt+1(1− δ) + rt+1)
qt+1At+1
1− qt+1 (Bt+1 + Ct+1)
}]
cet + qtzt+1 = qtAtit
nt = w
e
t + zt (qt (1− δ) + rt)








(Bt + Ct)− (B1,t+C1,t)A1,t At
it =
1








rt = FK(Kt, Ht, H
e
t )
wt = FH(Kt, Ht, H
e
t )
wet = FHe(Kt, Ht, H
e
t )
• Market clearing conditions:
Ht = (1− η)ht
Het = η
(1− η)ct + ηcet + ηit = θtF (Kt, Ht, Het )
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ηit [1− Φ(ω̄)µ− (1− Φ (ω̃)) γ]
• Laws of motion of aggregate shocks:
log(σω,t) = (1− ρσω)log(σω,ss) + ρσω log(σω,t−1) + εσω,t
log(θt) = ρθlog(θt) + εθ,t
whereKt+1 = (1−η)kt+1+ηzt+1, and {εσω ,t εθ,t} are a vector of exogenous shocks, and
{At, Bt, Ct, A1t, B1t, C1t, A2t, B2t, C2t} is defined identically as in section 1.3.3.
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1.4.3 Calibration
I calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency. The calibration strategy is
designed to ensure comparability between the debt-equity model and the debt-only
model. To achieve this goal, I closely follow the calibration strategy of Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and Chugh (2016). The former is used as a benchmark debt-only
model, and the latter investigates the transmission of uncertainty shocks under an
almost-identical setting as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Table 1.1 summarizes
calibrated parameter values.
For both the debt-equity model and debt-only model, the household discount
factor is set to β = 0.99, which is standard. Household preference is u(c, 1 − h) =
ln(c) + ν(1 − h), where I calibrate ν so that households’ labor supply hss is equal
to 0.3 in the steady state.
For both models, the production function F (Kt, Ht, H
e







I set α = 0.36, κ = 0.6399 and the capital depreciation rate δ = 0.02, following
standard RBC models.
A careful calibration of parameters characterizing debt and equity contracts
is absolutely crucial to making a reasonable comparison between the debt-only and
debt-equity models, since the role of financial frictions embedded in debt and equity
contracts in the transmission of uncertainty shocks is our main interest. For the
monitoring cost in case of default, I set µ = 0.25 in both models. Although the cost
of bankruptcy is directly observable to some degree, different studies report different
values for µ. For example Altman (1984) documents that the costs of default, such
39
as legal costs and lost sales and profits, are approximately 20 percent of total assets,
while Alderson and Betker (1995) report costs of approximately 36 percent of total
assets. However, the focus of this research is not on precisely estimating the cost
of bankruptcy, but instead, on comparing two models. For the reason, I simply use
the value assumed in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
The calibration of remaining parameters σω,ss, ξ, γ, and φ is more complicated.
For both models, the long-run average uncertainty is set to σω,ss = 0.2466, which I
estimate from firm-level data as described in Section 1.6.1. I calibrate ξ of the debt-
only model targeting a 240 basis points annualized real cost of borrowing in steady
state (q(1+rd)−1 = 60bps). The target moment is the average of the Baa-Treasury
spread for the sample period 1993-2014.11 Under this parameterization, the debt-
only model implies steady state quarterly default rate Φ(ω̄ss) = 1.12%, which is
slightly higher than the rate from Dun & Bradstreet data (quarterly default rate
of 0.97%) cited by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). I use this value to calibrate the
equity financing friction parameters of the debt-equity model.
For the debt-equity model, there are three remaining financial contract pa-
rameters, ξ, γ, and φ. I calibrate the parameters jointly targeting a 1.12% quarterly
default rate (which is implied by the debt-only model), a 240 basis point annualized
real borrowing cost on the debt contract, and an entrepreneurial share (1−s) of 0.26
in the steady state. The target moment for the steady state entrepreneurial share
mostly follows Holderness et al. (1999). They document that the average managerial
11The data can be downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Data. In particular, the
name of the series is “Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield on 10-Year
Treasury Constant Maturity” and the corresponding series ID is “BAA10Y”.
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stock ownership of top 40th to 50th percentile firms by size is 16.2% in 1935 and
24.4% in 1995. I select a 26% share for 2005, the midpoint of the sample period
1993-2014, by linear extrapolation of the long-term trend implied by Holderness
et al. (1999).12
For both models, I am able to exactly match all targeted moments. Under the
parameterization reported in Table 1.1, the two models have exactly identical real
costs of borrowing and default rates on debt in the steady state, implying that I can
investigate the role of equity financing frictions in the transmission of uncertainty
shocks by comparing the two models.
Parameter values characterizing the laws of motion of aggregate shocks (at
a quarterly frequency) are calibrated to match annual persistence parameters and
the variance-covariance matrix for TFP and uncertainty, as estimated from data. I
calculate aggregate TFP using annual data on labor and capital inputs. Using aggre-
gate TFP and the benchmark measure of uncertainty constructed in Section 1.6.1, I
estimate persistence parameters and the variance-covariance matrix of uncertainty
and TFP shocks at an annual frequency.13 Then, I calibrate quarterly persistence
parameters, and the variance-covariance matrix, using a simulated method of mo-
ments. In particular, I generate simulated series of uncertainty and TFP shocks for
400,000 quarters, convert simulated series into annual frequency, estimate annual
persistence parameters and the variance-covariance matrix using simulated series
12Leverage is not a targeted moment. The steady state leverage ratio is 0.565 and 0.560 for
the debt-only model and the debt-equity model respectively. The corresponding data moment for
leverage, defined as total assets over total liabilities, is 0.468. When defined as total debt over
total assets, the data moment is 0.203.
13The data availability allows me to measure uncertainty only at an annual frequency. See
Section 1.6.1 for details.
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converted to an annual frequency, and match annual persistence parameters and
the variance covariance matrix from data. This procedure yields a quarterly per-
sistence parameter of uncertainty shocks (ρσω) of 0.83. This estimate is similar to
Chugh (2016) who reports a persistence parameter of 0.83, estimated using data
from the Longitudinal Research Database. My persistence is lower than Christiano
et al. (2014) who estimate a persistence of 0.95. I estimate a standard deviation of
uncertainty shocks σσω = 0.0469. This result is in line with previous empirical find-
ings which document that σσω ranges from 0.0374 to 0.07 (Christiano et al., 2014,
Chugh, 2016). The quarterly persistence parameter of TFP shocks (ρθ) is 0.78. This
estimate is slightly lower than the value reported in the large-scale DSGE model es-
timation literature (Christiano et al., 2014). The standard deviation of TPF shocks
is σθ = 0.0071, similar to standard RBC literature (King and Rebelo, 1999). The
correlation between uncertainty and TFP shocks (corr (εσω ,t, εθ,t)) is −0.5887. This
is consistent with the notion that uncertainty increases during recessions, as I doc-
ument further in Section 1.6.1.
1.5 Numerical Results
1.5.1 Impulse Response Analysis
There are two goals of the impulse response analysis. The first is to understand
how uncertainty shocks affect firms’ financing decisions, especially equity financing
decisions. The second is to understand how the response of macroeconomic variables
to uncertainty shocks is amplified through equity financing frictions. In particular, I
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compare impulse response functions to uncertainty shocks of the debt-equity model
with those from the debt-only model to highlight the amplification mechanism that
is unique to the debt-equity model.
1.5.1.1 Dynamic Effect of Uncertainty Shocks
I numerically solve the model defined in Section 1.4.2 with a 3rd-order approx-
imation around the deterministic steady state. The impulse I consider in this section
is a one-time one-standard-deviation increase in the dispersion of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, holding the level of aggregate TFP at its steady state. In other words, I
do not take the correlation between the two shocks into account in calculating im-
pulse response functions. Under the current calibration, this equals roughly a 4.7%
increase in σω, from 0.246 to 0.257. Figures 1.2 to 1.4 present impulse response func-
tions of main variables of interest to the uncertainty shock for the debt-equity model
(solid lines with circles), and the debt-only model (dashed lines with ‘x’). Starting
with balance sheet variables, on impact, entrepreneurs in the debt-equity model im-
mediately downsize debt financing to approximately 4% below the steady state level
(top-right panel of Figure 1.3). As uncertainty increases, downside risk increases,
which results in an increased default probability (3rd-row left-column of Figure 1.4).
As a result, debt financing becomes more expensive, and the real borrowing cost
increases (2nd-row left-column of Figure 1.4) which induces entrepreneurs to lower
debt financing compared to the steady state. This transmission channel of uncer-
tainty shocks through debt financing frictions has already been discussed widely in
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the previous literature (Christiano et al., 2014, Gilchrist et al., 2014, Chugh, 2016),
and the debt-equity model is consistent with previous findings.
Figure 1.2: IRF in response to Uncertainty Shock - Aggregate variables































































































































































































Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions of aggregate variables to a one-time one-
standard-deviation increase in uncertainty shocks. Solid lines are from the debt-equity model.
Dashed lines are from the debt-only model.
However, the debt-equity model also has unique implications coming from eq-
uity financing frictions. As uncertainty increases, entrepreneurs raise less external
equity than in the steady state. As discussed in the partial equilibrium analysis,
increased uncertainty makes investing in external equity less attractive for two rea-
sons. First, an increased downside risk implies that capital good producing firms
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Figure 1.3: IRF in response to Uncertainty Shock - Balance Sheet





































































































































Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions of balance sheet variables to a one-time one-
standard-deviation increase in uncertainty shocks. Solid lines are from the debt-equity model.
Dashed lines are from the debt-only model.
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Figure 1.4: IRF in response to Uncertainty Shock - Others financial variables
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Price of Capital Good (q)
Debt-equity model
Debt-only model
Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions of other financial variables to a one-time
one-standard-deviation increase in uncertainty shocks. Solid lines are from the debt-equity model.
Dashed lines are from the debt-only model.
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are more likely to default, and thus less likely to generate positive profit. Secondly,
increased upside risk increases entrepreneurs’ temptation to divert profit (3rd-row
right-column of Figure 1.4). As a result, equity financing becomes more costly to
entrepreneurs, as the amount of equity they raise by selling a unit of shares s,
or equivalently the stock price e/s, decreases (2nd-row right-column of Figure 1.4),
which discourages entrepreneurs from raising external equity (middle-right of Figure
1.3).
The last remaining item of the liability side of the corporate balance sheet is
internal equity. Internal equity becomes more valuable as external financing becomes
more costly. Clearly, increased uncertainty makes both debt and equity financing
more costly. As a result, entrepreneurs are strongly motivated to accumulate internal
capital (bottom-right of Figure 1.3 and 4th-row left-column of Figure 1.4). Note that
entrepreneurs in the debt-equity model have a stronger incentive to build internal
equity than those in the debt-only model. While there is a single source of agency
costs in the debt-only model, the debt-equity model has an additional source of
agency costs, namely equity financing frictions. As a result, internal saving provides
a higher return in the debt-equity model than in the debt-only model in response
to adverse uncertainty shocks (4th-row left column of Figure 1.4).
Total equity shrinks immediately and sharply on impact in the debt-only model
as external equity shrinks, and overshoots above the steady state in following periods
as entrepreneurs start to build internal equity to overcome the higher cost of external
financing (middle-left of Figure 1.3). Overall, the size of the balance sheet shrinks
persistently, since downward pressure from debt and external equity is greater than
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the upward pressure from internal equity (Top-left of Figure 1.3).
Comparing the impulse responses of balance sheet variables from the two mod-
els, it is clear that the effect of uncertainty shocks is amplified in the debt-equity
model. I decompose the amplification effect arising from the equity contract into
two components: the direct and indirect effect. As discussed above, decreasing ex-
ternal equity financing directly affects the size of the balance sheet. Total equity
falls on impact and does not increase as much in subsequent periods compared to the
debt-only model, since a persistent decrease in external equity offsets the increase
in internal equity.
The indirect effect comes from the fact that the level of total equity determines
the debt capacity. As total equity decreases on impact, entrepreneurs’ debt capacity
shrinks. As a result, debt financing is further limited when external equity decreases.
In subsequent periods, total equity does not increase as much compared to the
debt-only model. This creates an additional downward pressure on debt financing
compared to the debt-only model. However, the impulse response functions of debt
suggest that the indirect effect is small quantitatively.
Next, I discuss fluctuations of aggregate variables. Since capital good produc-
ing firms are subject to financial frictions, uncertainty shocks affect the aggregate
economy mostly through the investment channel. Since the size of the balance sheet
shrinks, investment falls immediately on impact (middle-left panel of Figure 1.2).
Since the supply of capital goods decreases, the stock of capital and aggregate output
decreases in response to uncertainty shocks. Again, the effect of uncertainty shocks
is amplified in the debt-equity model since the balance sheet of capital producers
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shrinks more in the debt-equity model.
One potentially counter-factual prediction of the model is the impulse response
function of consumption (3rd column of Figure 1.2). Aggregate consumption is
counter-cyclical in response to uncertainty shocks. As discussed in Barro and King
(1984) and Chugh (2016), standard RBC models do not predict a procyclical im-
pulse response function of consumption to shocks that do not affect the marginal
productivity of labor or labor supply directly. The uncertainty shock falls into that
category.
Since the model is solved with a 3rd-order approximation, I can examine
whether there are non-linear effects of uncertainty shocks. First, I compare im-
pulse response functions to a one-time one-standard-deviation increase and decrease
in uncertainty (hereafter a 1-SD adverse and favorable shock, respectively) gener-
ated by the debt-equity model. Figure 1.5 reports impulse response functions of key
variables to these two shocks. The peaks of the main financial variables (cost of
borrowing, default probability, and diversion probability) generated by a 1-SD ad-
verse shock are slightly larger than the troughs generated by a 1-SD favorable shock.
The outcomes of financial contracts affect firms’ investment decision directly, and
as a consequence the trough of investment in response to a 1-SD adverse shocks is
slightly larger than the peak. However, regardless of these slight differences, the
shapes of the impulse response functions to these two shocks are largely symmetric
implying, that asymmetries in the effects of uncertainty shocks are only of second
order importance.
I also compare impulse response functions to one-standard-deviation and two-
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standard-deviation adverse uncertainty shocks generated by the debt-equity model.
Results reported in Figure 1.6 non-linearities are virtually nonexistent; the impulse
response functions to a two standard deviation shock are almost identical to the
impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shocks scaled by a factor of
two.
Financial frictions in debt and equity contracts are the core channel of the
transmission mechanism in my model. The two contractual parties, firms and finan-
cial institutions, are assumed to be risk neutral. As a result, the effects of uncertainty
shocks are captured mostly by linear terms, while non-linear effects of uncertainty
shocks remain limited. However, I do not conclude that non-linear effects would not
matter in a richer model. The present model is simplified to highlight the role of
equity financing in amplification of uncertainty shocks. Studying non-linear effects
requires a richer model which is beyond the scope of this research.
1.5.1.2 Dynamic Effect of TFP Shocks
In this section, I investigate how the model responds to a one-time one stan-
dard deviation decrease in TFP, holding uncertainty fixed at its steady state level.
This is approximately an 0.7% drop in TFP from the steady state. Impulse re-
sponses to the TFP shock are shown in Figures 1.7 to 1.9. As reported in Figure
1.8, both debt and external equity financing decrease in response to negative TFP
shocks (top-right and middle-right panel of Figure 1.8). However, the underlying
reason for decreasing external financing is different from the case of uncertainty
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Figure 1.5: IRF in Response to Adverse and Favorable Uncertainty Shock


















































































































































































Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions to one-time one-standard-deviation increases
and decreases in uncertainty generated by the debt-equity model. Solid lines are IRFs to adverse
uncertainty shocks and dotted lines are IRFs to favorable uncertainty shocks.
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Figure 1.6: IRF in Response to 1-SD and 2-SD Uncertainty Shock


















































































































































































Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions to one-time one-standard-deviation and two-
standard-deviation increases in uncertainty generated by the debt-equity model. Solid lines are
IRFs to 1-SD uncertainty shocks and dotted lines are IRFs to 2-SD uncertainty shocks.
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shocks. Since the marginal product of capital decreases in response to decreased
TFP, households demand less capital goods. As a result, entrepreneurs reduce the
size of the balance sheet not because of tighter financial constraints, but simply
to meet a reduced demand for capital goods. This is also reflected in a decrease
in the price of capital (4th-row right-column of Figure 1.9). Entrepreneurs reduce
debt and external equity financing for any given level of internal equity. In other
words, the demand for credit shifts in. As a result, both the default probability and
the diversion probability decrease (3rd-row left-column and 3rd-row right-column of
Figure 1.9), which leads to a decreasing real borrowing cost (2nd-row left-column
in Figure 1.9). Internal equity shrinks too (bottom-right and middle-right panel of
Figure 1.8), since agency costs decrease, which implies a decrease in the return on
internal saving (4th-row left-column of Figure 1.9).
The debt-equity model predicts a larger amplification of macroeconomic vari-
ables in response to TFP shocks compared to the debt-only model. However, the
amplification is concentrated at the early stage of the dynamics. In response to neg-
ative productivity shocks, entrepreneurs downsize their balance sheet in response to
the reduced demand for capital goods. In the debt-equity model, entrepreneurs have
two margins of active adjustment, debt and external equity, while in the debt-only
model, entrepreneurs only have a single margin of adjustment. Recall from equa-
tions (1.3) and (1.4) that the levels of debt and external equity financing are linear
functions of the level of internal equity. Thus, the size of the balance sheet shrinks
at a faster rate in the debt-equity model per unit decrease in internal equity.
Aggregate variables are all positively correlated with TFP shocks as expected.
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Figure 1.7: IRF in response to Productivity Shock - Aggregate variables


























































































































































































Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions of aggregate variables to a one-time one-
standard-deviation decrease in TFP. Solid lines are from the debt-equity model. Dashed lines are
from the debt-only model.
Output falls mostly because of the decrease in TFP and the capital stock. The
decrease in investment and the capital stock is a direct consequence of the decrease
in the size of the balance sheet. Impulse response functions of aggregate variables to
TFP shocks are amplified in the debt-equity model relative to the debt-only model.
This is a direct consequence of the different dynamics of the size of the balance
sheet. In contrast to the case of uncertainty shocks, consumption decreases as well.
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Figure 1.8: IRF in response to Productivity Shock - Balance Sheet




































































































































Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions of balance sheet variables to a one-time one-
standard-deviation decrease in TFP. Solid lines are from the debt-equity model. Dashed lines are
from the debt-only model.
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Figure 1.9: IRF in response to Productivity Shock - Other financial variables
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Price of Capital Good (q)
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Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions of other financial variables to a one-time one-
standard-deviation decrease in TFP shocks. Solid lines are from the debt-equity model. Dashed
lines are from the debt-only model.
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1.5.2 Simulation: Countercyclical External Financing Costs
In this section, I simulate the model economy to investigate its cyclical proper-
ties. I account for the estimated variance-covariance matrix of TPF and uncertainty
shocks as described in Section 1.4.3. Note that the correlation between two shocks is
-0.5587 which is consistent with the notion that uncertainty increases during reces-
sions. I simulate the model economy for 3,000 quarters where the initial 100 periods
are dropped, which is a standard procedure.
Table 1.2 reports the correlation coefficients of macroeconomic variables with
aggregate output. The first column shows the sample correlation from the data for
the sample period 1993Q1-2014Q4. Output, consumption, investment and stock
price are logged. All data moments are calculated using HP-filtered series with
a smoothing parameter λ = 1, 600. Both consumption and investment are highly
procyclical. I use the Baa-Treasury spread and the delinquency rate of industrial
and commercial loans to calculate the data moments for real borrowing cost and the
default rate, respectively. Both real borrowing cost and the default rate are counter-
cyclical, which suggests that debt financing frictions worsen during recessions. I use
the Russell 3000 index as my measure of the stock price, which is highly procyclical,
implying that entrepreneurs can raise more equity by issuing shares during booms.
In other words, equity financing is less costly during upturns.
The second and the third column of Table 1.2 report the model moments.
The most important finding is that, consistent with the data, the debt-equity model
generates a countercyclical real borrowing cost and default rate while the debt-only
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Table 1.2: Simulation - Cyclicality of Macroeconomic Variables
Variable Data Debt-only model Debt-equity model
Output 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.84 0.68 0.41
Investment 0.87 0.96 0.96
Real borrowing cost, q(1 + rd)− 1 -0.50 0.11 -0.57
Default rate, Φ(ω̄) -0.76 0.37 -0.50
Stock price, e/s 0.82 - 0.87
Diversion probability, 1− Φ(ω̂) - - -0.31
Notes: The table reports the correlation between each macroeconomic variable and aggregate out-
put. I simulate the economy for 3000 quarters where initial the 100 periods are dropped. Output,
consumption, investment, and stock price are logged before sample statistics are calculated. I use
the Baa-Treasury spread (FRED series ID: BAA10Y) to calculate the data moment for the real
borrowing cost. I use the delinquency rate of industrial and commercial loans (FRED series ID:
DRBLACBS) to calculate the data moment for the default rate. I use the Russell 3000 index
(FRED series ID: RU3000PR) to calculate the data moment for the stock price. All data moments
are calculated using HP-filtered series with a smoothing parameter λ = 1600. The sample period
is 1993Q1-2014Q4.
model generates the opposite. The additional amplification of uncertainty shocks
due to equity financing frictions is key to explaining the difference between the two
models. In both models, the real borrowing cost and the default rate decrease in
response to negative TFP shocks, as discussed above. In contrast, adverse uncer-
tainty shocks increase both the default risk and the cost of borrowing. If the effect
of adverse uncertainty shocks dominates the effect of adverse TFP shocks, then the
model will generate a countercyclical real borrowing cost and default rate. It turns
out that the effect of uncertainty shocks dominates in the debt-equity model, but
not in the debt-only model. In the debt-equity model, entrepreneurs cannot delever
as much as they do in the debt-only model since equity financing is also limited
due to increased uncertainty (see leverage in Figure 1.4). This is the fundamental
reason why the increase in the default rate and the real cost of borrowing is fur-
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Table 1.3: Simulation - Cyclicality of Balance Sheet Variables
Variable Debt-only model Debt-equity model
Balance sheet, i 0.96 0.96
Debt, d 0.95 0.95
External equity, e - 0.96
Total equity, e+ n 0.59 0.88
Leverage, d/i 0.79 0.72
Notes: The table reports correlations between each balance sheet variables and aggregate output.
I simulate the economy for 3000 quarters, where the initial 100 periods are dropped, a standard
procedure. All variables are logged except leverage.
ther amplified in the debt-equity model. At the same time, the debt-equity model
also predicts countercyclical equity financing costs. This is shown by the counter-
cyclical diversion probability and the procyclical stock price. Adverse uncertainty
shocks play a key role, as increased uncertainty worsens agency costs arising from
the equity contract.
Table 1.3 reports the cyclicality of balance sheet variables. Since adverse
TPF and uncertainty shocks both affect both debt and equity financing negatively,
financing variables are all procyclical. These findings are consistent with previous
empirical studies, for example Covas and Den Haan (2011).
In sum, the simulation result shows that the debt-equity model predicts both
procyclical debt and equity financing, and countercyclical default and external fi-
nancing costs. In contrast, the debt-only model fails to generate a countercyclical
default rate and real cost of borrowing, which reconfirms the importance of equity
financing frictions that amplify the effect of uncertainty shocks. This finding is
important, as existing literature is unable to explain the coexistence of procyclical
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debt and equity financing and countercyclical external financing costs (Covas and
Den Haan, 2012, Jermann and Quadrini, 2006, 2012).
Both the debt-only and the debt-equity model generate procyclical investment
and consumption (Table 1.2). For both models, investment is highly procyclical
and the cyclicality is slightly stronger than the data. In contrast, consumption is
substantially less procyclical in both models compared to the data. This is mainly
due to the response of consumption to adverse uncertainty shocks. Consumption
increases in response to adverse uncertainty shocks on impact (top-right of Figure
1.2), while it decreases in response to adverse TFP shocks (top-right of Figure





= −0.5887, the decrease in consumption due to negative
TFP shocks is offset on average by the increase in consumption due to adverse
uncertainty shocks in many cases. As a result, the procyclicality of consumption is
weaker in both models. Since uncertainty shocks are more amplified in the debt-
equity model than in the debt-only model, the procyclicality of consumption is
weaker in the debt-equity model.
1.6 Empirical Evidence
Uncertainty shocks have real consequences by affecting firms’ decisions over
debt and equity financing. While previous studies mostly focus on the role of debt
financing as a potential transmission channel of uncertainty shocks (Gilchrist et al.,
2014, Christiano et al., 2014), this paper highlights the importance of equity financ-
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ing. Thus, it is important to show empirically how firms’ equity financing decisions
respond to changes in uncertainty.
In this section, I document the relationship between firms’ equity financing de-
cisions and the level of uncertainty and provide suggestive evidence that uncertainty
and equity financing are negatively correlated. To do so, I construct a measure of
uncertainty taking a bottom-up approach. I estimate firm-level revenue-based total
factor productivity (TFPR) using annual balance sheet data of U.S. listed firms
from Compustat, and define uncertainty as the cross-sectional standard deviation
of estimated firm-level TFPR.14 This approach directly matches the model coun-
terpart of uncertainty, which is the dispersion of firms’ idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. I then document how firms’ equity financing decisions are associated with
the level of uncertainty by closely following the regression-based approach of Covas
and Den Haan (2011), who document cyclical patterns of debt and equity financ-
ing. I close the section with various robustness tests, which all suggest a negative
relationship between the level of uncertainty and equity financing.
1.6.1 Measuring Uncertainty
I follow Wooldridge’s extension of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to estimate
firm-level revenue-based total factor productivity. I first estimate the following
production function using firm-level data for a particular industry:
ln (V Ai,j,t) = βj + β
L
j lnLi,j,t + β
K
j lnKi,j,t + εi,j,t (1.14)
14I use total factor productivity (TFP) and revenue-based total factor productivity (TFPR)
interchangeably hereafter within Section 1.6. They both refer to TFPR.
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where V Ai,j,t, Li,j,t and Ki,j,t represent value-added, the number of employees, and
the beginning-of-period capital stock of firm i, in industry j, at time t respectively.15
I use annual balance sheet data of U.S. listed firms from Compustat for the sam-
ple period 1990 to 2014. Utility and financial firms are excluded from the sample.
Equity financing has become an important source of external financing since the
early 1980s, so it would be preferable to estimate firm-level TFPR for a sample
period including the early 1980s. However, the sample period starts in 1990 due to
limited data availability of the industry-level value-added deflator, the intermediate
goods price deflator, and the average annual wage, which are necessary for the es-
timation. I use a 2-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
level value-added price deflator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to convert
nominal V Ai,j,t into real terms. 3- and 4-digit deflators are used when available.
Beginning-of-period capital stocks are deflated using the aggregate non-residential
fixed investment deflator. Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides an in-
vestment good price deflator at the 2- and 3-digit NAICS level, the series starts only
in 1990. Since the stock of capital is built by summing the sequence of investment
over time, it is necessary to know the price deflator of investment goods purchased
prior to 1990, unless the firm’s investments are all made after 1990. For this reason,
there is a substantial loss of observations if an industry level investment good price
deflator is used instead of the aggregate price deflator.
Although it is more common to use plant-level data to estimate factor elastic-
ities and productivity (Olley and Pakes, 1996, Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), I use
15See Appendix A.1 for details of how variables are constructed.
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firm-level data, since plant-level data is usually available only for the manufactur-
ing sector, which imposes a substantial limit on the scope of analysis. By using
firm-level data, it is possible to extend the scope of analysis beyond manufacturing.
Since it is common to assume that each industry has different factor elasticities
of labor and capital, I allow βLj and β
K
j to vary across industry j, and estimate the
production function separately for each industry at the 2-digit NAICS level. The
estimation results for 18 industries are reported in Table 1.4. The estimation results
seem reasonable, as the sum of labor and capital elasticities is 0.87 on average across
industries.
We can further decompose total factor productivity εi,j,t into ei,j,t, which is
known to firms based on past information (or in other words, is a rational forecast
of productivity) and ui,j,t, which is a pure shock component (εi,j,t = ei,j,t + ui,j,t).
The model defines uncertainty as the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
Hence, it is necessary to estimate ui,j,t using estimated ε̂i,j,t. To do so, I assume that
the firm-level productivity evolves following an AR(1) process:
ε̂i,j,t = ρε̂i,j,t−1 + ηi + λj,t + ui,j,t. (1.15)
Following Bloom et al. (2012) and Gopinath et al. (2015), the equation (1.15) in-
cludes an industry-time-fixed effect λj,t in order to capture a time-varying industry-
wide component of total factor productivity. In this research, it is particularly im-
portant to distinguish aggregate (or industry-level) and idiosyncratic components of




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































changes in the within-industry dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity. I define the
OLS residual ûi,j,t from estimating equation (1.15) as the idiosyncratic productivity
shock of firm i in industry j at time t.
The TFP estimation yields a total of 68,379 firm-year TFP observations for
8,416 unique firms, which is approximately 85% of the sample used in the main
regression discussed in the next section, both in terms of the number of observations
and unique firms. There are fewer observations available for the variables required
to construct TFP than for the main regression.16 I do not require firms included in
the main regression to have all the information required to be included in the TFP
regression. I follow this strategy to maximize the number of observations for the
main regression.
The construction of my measure of uncertainty follows naturally as the weighted
average of the industry-level standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks
at a given year t: Uncertaintyt =
∑
j wj × SDj,t(ûi,j,t) where SDj,t(ûi,j,t) is the
within-industry cross-sectional standard deviation of ûi,j,t at a given period t and
wj is a time-invariant weight for each industry given by the fraction of aggregate
value-added accounted for by industry j. Time-invariant weights ensure that uncer-
tainty does not vary over time due to changes in industry composition. Figure 1.10
shows the annual GDP growth rate and Uncertaintyt for the sample period 1993-
2014. Uncertaintyt spikes up during the recessions in 2001 and 2008, consistent
with the notion that uncertainty increases during recessions.
16Note for instance that there is an additional loss of observations from estimating equation
(1.15) since an observation at t is dropped if an observation at t− 1 is missing.
65
Figure 1.10: Uncertainty and Real GDP Growth



































Real GDP growth rate (left axis)
Uncertainty − baseline (right axis)
Notes: The figure shows aggregate uncertainty, Uncertaintyt (solid line) and annual real GDP
growth (dotted line with triangles) for the sample period 1993-2014. Uncertaintyt is defined as
the standard deviation of firm-level TFP shocks. See equation (1.14) and (1.15) along with the
main text for the details of calculation. Annual real GDP growth is defined as the log difference
of real GDP (multiplied by 100). Shaded areas show NBER recession dates. 2001-2014.
Source: Author’s calculation, Compustat, Bereau of Economic Analysis
1.6.2 Uncertainty and Cyclicality of Equity Financing
Following Covas and Den Haan (2011), I take a regression approach to in-
vestigate the relationship between uncertainty and equity financing, using annual
balance sheet data of U.S. listed firms from Compustat for the sample period 1993
to 2014.17 Utility and financial firms are excluded from the sample. If a firm-year
observation violates the accounting identity that total assets equals total liabilites
17Note that I estimate firm level TFP for a sample period starting in 1990, not 1993. This is solely
because of observations lost due to lagged variables. In estimating TFP, lagged values of dependent
variables are required. As a result, observations in 1990 are lost. In estimating equation (1.15), an
additional year of observations are lost. This allows me to construct Uncertaintyt starting only in
1992. Lastly, I include lagged Uncertainty as an additional regressor (see equation (1.16)) which
results in an additional loss of observations in 1992.
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plus stockholders’ equity by more than 10%, it is dropped from the sample in order
to ensure data reliability. I describe the definition and construction of variables in
more detail in Appendix A.1. Table 1.5 reports sample statistics of firm character-
istics for the entire sample. There are 78,149 firm-year observations from 10,595
unique firms. On average, approximately 3,500 observations (or firms) are available
per year. The number of firms in the sample is similar to related previous studies
using Compustat, for example Fama and French (2005).
On average, sample firms have assets worth $3,200 million 2009 USD. The
distribution of total assets is skewed to the right. Firms’ average sales are approx-
imately $2,600 million 2009 USD, and this distribution is also skewed to the right.
Net stock sales are on average 14% of beginning-of-period total assets (or lagged to-
tal assets). This number is similar to Fama and French (2005), who document that
average equity issues by listed firms in the U.S. in a given year during 1993-2002
represent 12.6% of total assets.
The bottom half of Table 1.5 reports summary statistics of firm-year observa-
tions for the subset of data with positive net stock sales. There are 43,994 firm-year
observations associated with positive net stock sales, accounting for approximately
55% of the entire sample of firm-year observations. There are 9,481 unique firms,
roughly 95% of all unique firms in the entire sample, that experience positive net
stock sales at least once during the sample period. On average, firms report four
years of positive net stock sales (43,994 firm-year observations with positive net
stock sales divided by 10595 unique firms). Considering that, on average, sample









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10,595 unique firms), approximately half of the observations per firm are associated
with positive net stock sales.
Table 1.5 reveals important differences between net equity issuers compared
to other firms. Net equity issuers are smaller in terms of asset size and total sales,
and have higher growth opportunities as measured by Tobin’s Q. This is consistent
with predictions of corporate finance theories, that smaller firms with high growth
opportunities actively issue equity in financial markets.
The specification of the main regression equation is







where Equity financei ,t is the net amount of external equity raised by firm i at time
t, ∆RGDPt is the real GDP growth rate, Uncertaintyt is the level of uncertainty,
and Xi,t is a vector of firm-level control variables. A firm fixed effect ηi is included to
control for time-invariant firm-specific factors that could affect financing decisions. I
measure Equity financei,t as net sales of stock normalized by lagged total assets as
in Covas and Den Haan (2011). While Equity financei,t can be measured in other
ways, for example as changes in stockholders’ equity at book or market value, net
sales of stock is strictly preferred considering that this paper highlights the role of
equity raised by selling stock to outside shareholders. Note that the book value of
equity changes not only due to sales of stock but also due to changes in retained
earnings. Considering that retained earnings are defined as profits that are not
paid to stockholders, they should be considered as an internal source of financing.
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Meanwhile, the market value of stockholders’ equity may vary for reasons other
than sales of stock or changes in retained earnings. For example, if stock prices
change, the market value of equity changes regardless of firms’ financing decisions
or changes in retained earnings. However, net sales of stock cannot be changed
by retained earnings or changes in stock price, unless firms decide to engage in a
financial contract with external shareholders and sell shares.
Table 1.6 summarizes the size and the frequency of equity issuance in the
sample. Approximately 75% of the observations are associated with positive gross
stock sales, which suggests that equity issuance is common among listed firms in
the U.S. In terms of size, approximately 40% of the observations are associated with
gross stock sales greater than 1% of lagged total assets. It is also notable that a
non-negligible fraction of observations are associated with sizable equity issuance
relative to the existing size of the firm (greater than 3% of total assets). Net stock
sales show a similar pattern. Approximately 50% of observations report positive net
stock sales and approximately 20% of the observations are associated with net equity
issuance that exceeds 3% of lagged total assets. Figure 1.11 shows the distribution
of net and gross stock sales.
The vector Xi,t of firm-level control variables includes cash flow, Tobin’s Q,
sales growth, asset growth,18 and firm size as measured by the log of beginning-
of-period total assets (or lagged total assets). These variables are chosen mostly
following Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Fama and French (2005), Covas and Den Haan
18Cash flow, sales growth, and asset growth are all normalized by lagged total assets. See
Appendix A.2 for a precise definition of variables.
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Table 1.6: Frequency of Equity Financing
Interval Gross Stock Sales Net Stock Sales
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
less than 0% - - 20,563 26.31%
0% 18,659 23.88% 13,592 17.39%
0∼1% 30,060 38.46% 20,180 25.82%
1∼3% 10,563 13.52% 6,681 8.55%
greater than 3% 18,867 24.14% 17,133 21.92%
Total observations 78,149 100% 78,149 100%
Notes: The table shows the number of observations and relative frequency of positive gross and
net stock sales. Gross and net stock sales are defined as in Table 1.5; Net stock sales are measured
as sales of common and preferred stock (SSTK) minus purchases of common and preferred stock
(PRSTKC) normalized by beginning-of-year total assets, or lagged total assets (AT). Gross stock
sales are measured as sales of common and preferred stock (SSTK) normalized by beginning-of-
year total assets.
Source: Compustat
(2011), and Erel et al. (2012), all of which report firm-level variables that are closely
related to firms’ financing decisions. Higher cash flows imply that firms have more
internal funds to finance production and investment projects. The pecking order
theory predicts that firms prefer internal sources of funds to external financing,
since external financing is more expensive due to information asymmetry problems
that affect financial contracts. Hence, firms with higher cash flow are expected to
have lower net stock sales. Tobin’s Q measures firms’ growth opportunities. If
firms have higher growth opportunities, they are more likely to raise external funds,
in addition to using internal funds. This implies that firms with higher Tobin’s
Q are likely to have higher net stock sales. Sales growth is potentially related to
external financing in two opposite ways. Holding firms’ profitability constant, higher
sales growth possibly implies that more internal funds are available, in which case
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Notes: The left panel shows the distribution of net stock sales. The right panel shows the dis-
tribution of gross stock sales. Gross and net stock sales are defined as in Table 1.5; Net stock
sales are measured as sales of common and preferred stock (SSTK) minus purchases of common
and preferred stock (PRSTKC) normalized by beginning-of-year total assets, or lagged total assets
(AT). Gross stock sales are measured as sales of common and preferred stock (SSTK) normal-
ized by beginning-of-year total assets. Capital letters in parentheses represent Compustat variable
mnemonics. The size of bin is 3%. For both panels, the largest bin includes all observations greater
than 20%. The smallest bin includes all observations less than -20%. See Table 1.6 for more details
of the distribution.
Source: Compustat
firms are less likely to issue equity to finance production and investment projects.
However, it is also possible that firms experience higher sales growth when they are
expanding their business rapidly. In this case, firms may need to issue more stock
to meet financing needs that cannot be covered solely with internal funds. Finally,
higher asset growth is likely to be associated with positive net stock sales, since
faster growing firms are less likely to be able to meet their financing needs solely
with internal funds.
Firm size is included since firms in different size classes exhibit different fi-
nancing patterns over the business cycle. Covas and Den Haan (2011) document
that smaller firms tend to exhibit stronger procyclicality for both debt and equity
72
financing compared to larger firms, while in contrast the largest firms (top 1% of
Compustat firms) raise equity countercyclically.
Equity financei,t is winsorized at 300% and -300%.
19 All other firm-level
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles.
Table 1.7 summarizes the estimation results of equation (1.16). I use a least
square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator to estimate the panel regression model.
To show that the sample is consistent with the previous empirical literature on
the cyclicality of equity financing, I first estimate the regression model without
Uncertainty. Spec 1 shows that equity financing is positively correlated with real
GDP growth both contemporaneously and in lags, consistent with previous empirical
literature.
Spec 2 - 3 show that the level of uncertainty is negatively correlated with
firms’ equity financing decisions in lags. Spec 4, which controls for the largest set
of firm characteristics, suggests that the level of uncertainty is negatively correlated
with equity financing, both contemporaneously and in lags. Results are statistically
significant at 1% for all specifications. The economic significance of uncertainty
is also non-negligible. A one standard deviation marginal increase in uncertainty,
which is 0.018, results in a roughly 0.7 percentage point decrease in net sales of
stock both simultaneously and in lags.20 In other words, an average firm with total
19The top and bottom 0.5 percentiles of Equity financei,t are 957% and -25% respectively. Since
the distribution of Equity financei,t is substantially skewed, winsorizing at the top and bottom 0.5
percentiles seems insufficient. However, the baseline results do not change in case of winsorizing
at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles.
20Note that net sales of equity are normalized by lagged total assets. So, the exact interpretation
of the point estimate is that there is a 0.7 percentage point decrease in the “net equity sales-to-total
assets ratio.” in response to a 1 standard deviation increase in uncertainty.
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Table 1.7: Aggregate uncertainty and net stock sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spec 1 Spec2 Spec 3 Spec 4
RGDP growtht 0.0077
∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ -0.00020
(9.91) (8.38) (6.50) (-0.21)
RGDP growtht−1 0.0024
∗∗∗ 0.0021∗ 0.0016 0.0013
(3.18) (1.80) (1.44) (1.17)
Cashflowi,t -0.20
∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
(-14.80) (-14.84) (-8.57) (-8.47)
Tobin′sQi,t 0.035
∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
















Constant -0.030∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(-8.86) (2.03) (2.54) (20.51)
Adjusted R2 0.417 0.417 0.490 0.507
Observations 78149 78149 78149 78149
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table summarizes firm fixed effects panel regression results using a least square dummy
variable (LSDV) estimator. The dependent variable is Equity financei,t for all specifications. All
specifications include firm fixed effects. See Appendix A.2 for the detailed definition of firm-level
control variables. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics with adjusted standard errors clustered
by firms.
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assets of $3,200 million constant U.S. dollars reduces net stock sales by $22 million
constant U.S. dollars when the measure of uncertainty increases by one standard
deviation.
All specifications suggest that equity financing is negatively correlated with
cash flow and positively related to Tobin’s Q, consistent with the prediction of
corporate finance theories discussed above. Sales growth is negatively correlated
with equity financing (Spec 3 and Spec 4). The result is in line with the hypothesis
that an increase in total sales, controlling for asset growth and cash flow, implies
sufficient internal funds that firms are less inclined to rely on external financing.
However, a negative correlation between sales growth and net sales of equity is not
consistent with Erel et al. (2012), who report a strong positive relationship between
sales growth and seasoned equity offerings. The opposite result is mostly due to
the inclusion of asset growth. As Erel et al. (2012) do not control for asset growth,
the effect of sales growth is confounded with the effect of asset growth. Indeed,
the regression results show that asset growth is positively correlated with equity
financing. This is consistent with corporate finance theories predicting that internal
funds are not fully sufficient to meet the financing needs of fast growing firms, and
thus these firms must tap an external source of funds such as debt or equity. Lastly,
firm size is negatively correlated with equity financing, which suggests that smaller
firms may be more likely to operate at a smaller-than-optimal size, and thus need
more funds to reach optimal size.
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1.6.3 Robustness
In this section, I show that the empirical results in the previous section are
robust to using alternative measures of uncertainty.
As a first exercise, I construct a measure of uncertainty based on firm-level
stock returns (UncertaintyStockt ) following Bloom et al. (2012).
21 In particular, I
calculate the standard deviation of monthly stock returns across months and firms
within a year using CRSP.22 As Bloom et al. (2012) point out, a stock return-based
uncertainty measure has one notable advantage over TFP-based uncertainty mea-
sures. The residuals from estimating equation (1.15) are productivity shocks in
the sense that they are not forecasted by the regression equation, but this does
not necessarily imply that the residuals are not forecasted by firms. In contrast,
UncertaintyStockt is immune to such concerns. The estimation result is reported in
the 1st column of Table 1.8. Stock return-based uncertainty is negatively correlated
with equity finance. A one standard deviation increase in UncertaintyStockt (0.027)
results in an 0.7 percentage point decrease in net stock sales in lags. The statis-
tical and economic significance of UncertaintyStockt is similar to other uncertainty
measures. Results using a stock return-based uncertainty measure constructed at
an industry level (UncertaintyStock−INDt ), reported in the 2nd column, show slightly
stronger economic significance. To be more concrete, a one standard deviation in
UncertaintyStock−INDt (0.028) results in a 1 percentage point decrease in net sales
21The correlation between Uncertaintyt and Uncertainty
Stock
t is 0.79.
22Observations are excluded from the calculation if fewer than 6 months of observations are
available per year per firm.
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of stock in lags.
As a second exercise, I use the CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index (V IXt), which
is a widely used proxy of aggregate uncertainty.23 The result is reported in the third
column, and it strongly supports the hypothesis that uncertainty adversely affects
equity financing. A one standard deviation increase in the V IXt (7.1) results in
a 1.4 percentage point decrease in net sales of stock contemporaneously, and 0.6
percentage point in lags.
As a third exercise, I investigate if firm size is related to the degree to which
uncertainty affects firms’ equity financing decisions. This exercise is motivated by
Covas and Den Haan (2011), who document that equity financing is significantly
procyclical, and that the procyclicality increases as firm size decreases. I introduce
interaction terms between uncertainty and firm size, and between real GDP growth
and firm size. Results are reported in the first column of Table 1.9. The coefficients
of the interaction terms between uncertainty and firm size are positive and signifi-
cant, which implies that smaller firms’ equity financing decisions are more severely
and adversely affected by an increase in uncertainty.24
As a fourth exercise, I investigate how debt financing is affected by uncertainty.
I re-estimate equation (1.16) replacing the dependent variable with Debt financei,t,
which is changes in total debt normalized by lagged total assets. The result is
reported in the second column of Table 1.9. The results suggest that debt financing
also decreases as uncertainty increases, and the sensitivity increases as firm size
23The correlation between Uncertaintyt andV IXt is 0.55.
24The lagged interaction term between real GDP growth and firm size is negative and significant,
which implies that smaller firms’ equity financing decisions are more sensitive to the business cycle.
This result is consistent with Covas and Den Haan (2011).
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Table 1.8: Alternative Uncertainty Measures
(1) (2) (3)
Equity financet Equity financet Equity financet
RGDP growtht 0.00048 0.0018
∗ -0.0025∗∗∗
(0.48) (1.79) (-2.77)


































Adjusted R2 0.507 0.506 0.508
Observations 78149 78149 78149
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table summarizes firm fixed effects panel regression results using a least square dummy
variable (LSDV) estimator replacing aggregate uncertainty, Uncertaintyt, with alternative mea-
sures of uncertainty. All specifications include firm fixed effects. See Appendix A.2 for the detailed
definition of firm-level control variables. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics using adjusted
standard errors clustered by firms.
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Table 1.9: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity financei,t Debt financei,t Leveragei,t Equity financei,t Equity financei,t
RGDP growtht 0.0029 -0.020
∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.93) (-7.51) (-7.35) (4.05)
RGDP growtht−1 0.028
∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.0035
(6.72) (5.19) (6.96) (1.25)
RGDP growtht × Firmsizei,t -0.00056 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗
(-1.28) (10.67) (11.43) (-4.60) (-4.97)
RGDP growtht−1 × Firmsizei,t -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗ -0.00070∗ -0.00053
(-7.95) (-6.13) (-7.46) (-1.79) (-1.36)
Cashflowi,t -0.14
∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.046∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
(-9.56) (1.06) (-5.69) (-8.88) (-9.15)
Tobin′sQi,t 0.013
∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.0089∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(13.85) (-13.83) (-13.24) (13.69) (14.19)
Sales growthi,t -0.054
∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(-7.21) (6.65) (8.11) (-5.69) (-6.01)
Total asset growthi,t 0.083
∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(10.81) (9.87) (13.06) (17.06) (17.10)
Firmsizei,t -0.29
∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗







Uncertaintyt × Firmsizei,t 0.63∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(10.17) (11.50) (15.57)








UncertaintyINDt × Firmsizei,t 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(9.57) (9.71)
UncertaintyINDt−1 × Firmsizei,t 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(10.80) (10.64)
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.523 0.191 0.286 0.514 0.520
Observations 78149 78149 78149 78149 78149
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table summarizes firm fixed effects panel regression results using a least square dummy
variable (LSDV) estimator with interaction terms between uncertainty and firm size, and real GDP
growth and firm size. The dependent variable of the second and the third column is Debt financei,t
and Leveragei,t respectively. See Appendix A.2 for the detailed definition of firm-level control
variables. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics using adjusted standard errors clustered by
firms.
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decreases. Replacing the dependent variable with leveragei,t, which is the ratio
between total debt and beginning-of-period total assets, shows a similar result (the
third column of Table 1.9). As uncertainty increases, leverage decreases.
As a fifth exercise, I investigate how industry-level uncertainty affects firms’
equity financing decisions. This exercise addresses a concern that different industries
potentially have a different degree of idiosyncratic productivity dispersion in a given
year. The measure of industry-level uncertainty is constructed similarly as in the
aggregate uncertainty measure, Uncertaintyt, discussed in the previous section. The
only difference is that I take the standard deviation of OLS residuals ûi,j,t of equation
(1.15) at the two-digit NAICS level within a year. Hence, industry-level uncertainty,
UncertaintyINDj,t , varies not only by t but also by industry j. The fourth column
of Table 1.9 presents estimation results of equation (1.16) replacing Uncertaintyt
with UncertaintyINDj,t . Implications are identical to the baseline results reported in
Table 1.7. Industry level uncertainty is negatively correlated with equity financing
both contemporaneously and in lags, and the results are statistically significant at
1%. In all specifications, I control for the business cycle using contemporaneous and
lagged real GDP growth rates. Using industry-level uncertainty allows me to control
for the business cycle in an alternative way, which is replacing RGDP growtht and
RGDP growtht−1 with a time fixed effect. This address a potential concern that
uncertainty measures are falsely picking up business cycles instead of uncertainty.
As the last column of Table 1.9 reports, the inclusion of the time-fixed effect yields
an identical conclusion; equity financing is negatively correlated with uncertainty.
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1.7 Concluding Remarks
In this research, I study how uncertainty shocks affect firms’ financing de-
cisions, in particular equity financing, and how equity finance affects the macroe-
conomic impact of uncertainty shocks. I build a DSGE model with endogenous
debt and equity contracts to investigate macroeconomic consequences of uncertainty
shocks working through financial frictions. In my model, firms reduce debt financ-
ing in response to increased uncertainty, as debt becomes more expensive due to the
increased default probability. This is consistent with the predictions of standard
financial accelerator models. The model also predicts a decrease in equity financing
in response to higher uncertainty, consistently with the data.
Introducing an endogenous equity contract into a DSGE model is a unique
feature of the model, and this feature is important since it affects macroeconomic
dynamics in response to uncertainty shocks. Incorporating equity financing gener-
ates additional amplification of uncertainty shocks since firms reduce equity financ-
ing whenever uncertainty is high. Through this channel, uncertainty shocks are
amplified relative to a model with only debt contracts.
By incorporating uncertainty shocks and their amplification through equity
financing frictions, my model is also able to explain procyclical debt and equity
financing along with countercylical external financing costs, a combination which
existing models fail to explain.
I also provide empirical evidence on the relationship between uncertainty and
equity financing using firm-level data from Compustat. I show that firms reduce
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both debt and equity financing in response to higher uncertainty.
I mention two directions for future research. First, it is widely assumed that
different classes of firms have varying degrees of financial constraints. Existing re-
search suggests that smaller firms are more sensitive to uncertainty shocks, and my
empirical results show that smaller firms’ debt and equity finance decisions are more
sensitive to uncertainty. However, the model in this paper is silent regarding poten-
tial heterogeneity in the effect of uncertainty shocks on equity financing decisions.
Future research should model heterogeneous responses of firms’ financing decisions
to uncertainty shocks.
Secondly, this paper studies mostly uncertainty shocks. Since the financial
contract that I propose in this paper can easily be embedded in other representative
agent DSGE models, the simple model in this paper can be extended almost imme-
diately to medium/large scale models. In this regard it will also be interesting to see
how the equity finance channel affects the economy’s responses to other aggregate
shocks, such as monetary policy shocks.
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Chapter 2: On Corporate Borrowing, Credit Spreads and Economic
Activity in Emerging Economies: An Empirical Inves-
tigation (coauthored with Julián Caballero and Andrés
Fernández)
2.1 Introduction
One of the most important developments in the macroeconomics of emerging
market economies (EMEs) since the beginning of the twenty-first century is a major
increase in their corporate sectors’ reliance on foreign debt. The stock of interna-
tional debt issued by these economies has quadrupled in a little over a decade, from
an outstanding stock of debt of about 600 billion USD in the early 2000s to 2.4
trillion USD by the end of 2014.1 This increase has created an intense debate about
the macro implications and desirability of expanded corporate foreign borrowing. A
benign view posits that for EMEs, often portrayed as credit-constrained small open
economies, access to international capital markets by the corporate sector is essential
for sustaining long-run economic growth, as it can provide domestic entrepreneurs
with needed funds to finance new investment projects that would otherwise not be
1This stylized fact is further documented in Section 2.3 for the 17 EMEs that we consider when
computing the stock of international debt.
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available from local sources. However, the costly crises of the 1990s and, more re-
cently, the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, have taught us that greater access
to capital markets also entails risks for EMEs, particularly stemming from abrupt
changes in the amount and the cost of international capital available. This has
placed at center stage the role of external financial conditions as important drivers
of economic activity in EMEs.
This paper seeks to shed new light on the role that external financial factors
play when accounting for economic activity in emerging economies. Our particular
interest is to quantify the extent to which changes in the lending conditions faced
by the corporate sector of EMEs in world capital markets affect economic activity
in these economies. For that purpose we build an external financial indicator for
several EMEs using individual bond-level data on spreads from corporate bonds
issued in foreign capital markets and traded in secondary markets. We then quantify
how much information this indicator contains about future fluctuations in economic
activity in these economies, and how activity responds to shocks in the indicator.
Our focus is on bond issuance because, as we document in detail for 17 EMEs,
corporates have preferred this form of finance in recent years when increasing their
reliance on international sources of funding.
We find strong evidence that our constructed external financial indicator that
we construct contains information on future economic activity in EMEs, even after
controlling for other domestic and external factors that may also drive aggregate
fluctuations in these economies. Results from panel forecasting regressions indicate
that, on average, an increase of 100 basis points in the external financial indicator
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is associated with a decrease in real output growth of 0.22 percentage points in the
following quarter, and up to 0.34 percentage points three quarter ahead. Further-
more, using a panel structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model, we find that
an identified (adverse) shock to the external financial indicator generates a large
and protracted fall in economic activity. A one standard deviation shock in the
external financial indicator, equivalent to an increase in borrowing costs of 150 ba-
sis points, leads to a fall in real output growth of up to 0.75 percent four quarters
ahead, and long-run mean growth is reached again only three years after the shock.
Furthermore, 35 percent of the forecast error variance in real output growth is ac-
counted for by shocks to the external financial indicator. This number is between
two and three times that obtained in previous studies that quantified the role of risk
premia shocks for emerging economies’ business cycles, but which relied solely on
sovereign risk and did not account for the effect of corporate spreads. When looking
at other macroeconomic variables, namely aggregate consumption and investment,
we find that both react vigorously to shocks to the external financial indicator, with
consumption affected more than investment.
These findings are robust to several extensions. First, our benchmark results
are virtually unchanged after we control for possible spillovers from sovereign to
corporate risk. This is consistent with the fact, also documented, that in recent
times new international lending in EMEs has mainly been channeled to the corporate
sector, while governments have substituted foreign sources of finance for domestic
ones. Second, we show that, while considerably reduced, the information content
of our external financial indicator continues to be significant once we control for
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the VIX, a prominent measure of uncertainty and risk aversion in global capital
markets. Third, we find that the predictive power of the external financial indicator
considerably increased during the world financial crisis and, more importantly, the
post-recovery years. Moreover, its predictive ability continues to hold when we
consider bonds issued only by non-financial corporations. Both results are consistent
with the fact that, in the post-crisis period, the bulk of the surge in international
bond financing by the corporate sector has been done by non-financial corporations.
Lastly, we validate our results when using alternative schemes for identification of
shocks to our external financial indicator, alternative measures of economic activity,
and alternative specifications of the panel SVAR.
This paper is related to and contributes to four different literatures. The styl-
ized facts that we document in terms of the patterns in external financing by EMEs
contribute to the work by Shin (2014), Turner (2014) and Powell (2014), among oth-
ers, on how corporations from emerging economies have stepped up their financing
through international capital markets (rather than traditional bank lending). Our
work complements this literature by providing a systematic analysis of the exter-
nal financing patterns exhibited by several EMEs, particularly the large increase by
non-financial corporations (NFCs) in international bond issuance.
Our work showing that spreads of international bonds issued by NFCs in EMEs
contain information on future economic activity contributes to a long-standing lit-
erature that studies the relevance of external financial factors when accounting for
aggregate fluctuations in these economies.2 External financial factors in this lit-
2At least since Dı́az-Alejandro (1985) the literature has explored how international financial
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erature are typically proxied by U.S. interest rates or spreads of EMEs’ sovereign
debt. The papers in this literature usually estimate VAR models that identify the
dynamic effects on EMEs’ business cycle from exogenous shocks to U.S. interest
rates or EMEs’ sovereign spreads (see, e.g., the seminal papers by Canova, 2005 and
Uribe and Yue, 2006).3 This literature finds that external financial factors explain
a sizeable proportion of business cycles in emerging economies. A recent paper by
Akinci (2013), however, shows that the effect of international financial conditions on
EME economic activity is driven not by fluctuations in U.S. interest rates, but by
risk aversion in global financial markets—as proxied by the volatility of U.S. stock
prices—and their effect on sovereign spreads.4 We contribute to this literature by
paying particular attention to the role of corporate external borrowing, instead of
sovereign borrowing, motivated by the aforementioned shift in the composition of
borrowers in foreign capital markets from sovereigns to corporates in EMEs.
conditions affect EMEs. A strand of the literature focuses on the role of capital flows in driving
economic conditions or the incidence of crises, either because of surges in inflows (see, e.g., Calvo
et al., 1993; Fernández-Arias, 1996; Reinhart and Reinhart, 2009, and Caballero, 2016) or because
of sudden stops in inflows (see, e.g., Calvo, 1998 and Calvo et al., 2008). Another strand of
the literature studies the effects of international interest rates and global risk aversion on EMEs’
business cycles (see references in main text). Our paper contributes to the latter literature.
3Several subsequent papers have followed the seminal works of Canova and Uribe and Yue,
including the papers by Mackowiak (2007), Agénor et al. (2008), and Österholm and Zettelmeyer
(2008). Izquierdo et al. (2008) take a different modelling approach, estimating a Vector Error
Correction Model (VECM). Recently, a new vintage of papers using a GVAR approach have
studied the global spillovers from U.S. monetary policy, including Chudik and Fratzscher (2011),
Chen et al. (2012), Feldkircher and Huber (2016), and Georgiadis (2015). Despite the use of
different samples, identifying assumptions and estimation techniques, they all find that external
factors explain a sizeable proportion of business cycles in EMEs, ranging from 20 to 60 percent
of the variability of economic activity. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) is an early paper showing that
sovereign spreads in EMEs behave in a countercyclical manner, which is what subsequent work
shows.
4The effect of global risk aversion on EMEs’ economic fluctuations has also been highlighted by
Matsumoto (2011) and Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes (2013); although, these papers are silent
on its effect on country spreads. On the effects of global factors on EMEs’ sovereign spreads,
Arora and Cerisola (2001), González-Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2008), and Ciarlone et al. (2009)
show that EMEs’ sovereign spreads depend negatively on global financial conditions, such as U.S.
interest rates, U.S. high-yield corporate spreads, and the volatility of U.S. stock prices, respectively.
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The empirical work we undertake in this paper in terms of constructing an
external financial indicator directly from bond spreads is mostly inspired by Gilchrist
et al. (2009) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) on the effects of credit market shocks
and economic fluctuations in the United States (subsequently extended to Western
Europe by Gilchrist and Mojon, 2014 and Bleaney et al., 2016). Our work expands
their analysis to the case of EMEs, while simultaneously providing an analysis of
the patterns of foreign finance in these economies, which in turn justifies our focus
on the international bond issuance by the corporate sector.
The paper is also related to a new vintage of dynamic, stochastic equilibrium
models motivated by much of the empirical findings just highlighted. These models
aim at accounting for business cycles in EMEs through financial shocks and the
amplifying effects of financial frictions for the decisions of private agents (see, most
recently, Fernández and Gulan, 2015).5 Our work contributes to this literature by
providing empirical evidence of the hypotheses derived from these models regarding
the links between corporate bond spreads and economic activity. Our results offer
strong support to the key hypotheses in this literature insofar as external financial
factors are a key determinant for economic activity in EMEs through their effect on
the corporate sector.
The paper is divided into seven sections, including this introduction. Section
2.2 summarizes the theoretical framework used to think about the links between
5This research agenda was initiated by the contributions of Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and
Uribe and Yue (2006). Subsequent works include Garćıa-Cicco et al. (2010), Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2011), Chang and Fernández (2013), and Fernández et al. (2015a). In a recent theoretical
contribution, Chang et al. (2016) study the business cycle effects of the endogenous choice of
finance modes for emerging economies.
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international borrowing, credit spreads and economic activity in EMEs. Section 2.3
presents the stylized facts on international corporate borrowing in these economies.
Section 2.4 describes how we construct the external financial indicator and stud-
ies its time series dynamics. Section 2.5 presents our benchmark results in terms
of the forecasting information content of the external financial indicator, and the
macro dynamics following a shock to it. Section 2.6 presents various extensions and
robustness checks. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 2.7. Appendix B
includes further technical material as well as further robustness analysis.
2.2 External Corporate Borrowing, Credit Spreads and Economic
Activity in EMEs: A Theoretical Framework
Considerable progress has been made in recent years in building microfounded
small open economy models that account for the linkages among external financial
factors, foreign corporate debt issuance and economic activity in small EMEs. Two
clear hypotheses emerge from these works:
1. Spreads on bonds issued by corporates of EMEs in international cap-
ital markets contain information on aggregate economic activity. Thus, proxies of
economic activity in these economies ought to be correlated with these spreads over
the business cycle.
2. Exogenous perturbations to these spreads will have an impact on future
economic activity, mainly via their effect on aggregate investment and consumption.
For the remainder of this section we provide a brief summary of the main
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insights from the theoretical frameworks developed in recent times that have estab-
lished a link between external financial factors, foreign corporate debt and economic
activity in these economies. The goal is not to provide a comprehensive literature
review. Instead, we intend to lay out the main insights from these studies that give
rise to the type of empirical tests undertaken in the rest of our work.
The literature has postulated two reasons why agents in EMEs may borrow
funds from world capital markets. One is associated with factors that affect the
level of aggregate investment. The other relates to factors affecting aggregate con-
sumption. Each one, in turn, articulates a channel through which changes in the
financial conditions of such borrowing may have real effects on economic activity.
The first reason, linked to investment, relates to corporates in EMEs facing
borrowing needs. Early works in this literature modeled this by assuming that firms
borrow in international markets to finance working-capital needs (Neumeyer and
Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006). This assumption requires firms to hold an amount
of non-interest-bearing assets to finance a share of resources devoted to remunerating
inputs of production, namely capital and labor.6 In practice, this assumption drives
a wedge between inputs’ marginal products and marginal costs. That wedge captures
the financial cost associated with the share of resources paid with funds borrowed
at interest rate R. Hence, changes to external financial conditions that affect R will
be correlated with economic activity in these economies to the extent that financial
costs associated with the use of inputs in total production change, driving firms in






, η ≥ 0, where
κ are non-interest-bearing assets, η is the fraction of resources devoted to remunerate inputs of
production, wh is the wage bill and rkk is the amount of resources devoted to renting capital.
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EMEs to optimally alter their production and investment levels.7
The second reason postulated in the literature as to why agents in EMEs
may borrow funds from world capital markets relates to their desire to smooth
consumption. It is often assumed that this is accomplished within an environment
of market incompleteness where agents in these economies have only the possibility of
issuing one-period, non-state-contingent debt in international markets at an interest
rate R. Hence, an upward movement in R triggered by changes in foreign financial
conditions will be related to a slowdown in economic activity amid a fall in aggregate
consumption.8
When thinking about R, the (gross) interest rate at which debt with the rest of
the world is issued by agents in EMEs, whether for investment and/or consumption
needs, the literature has unanimously embraced the small open economy assumption
whereby the EME is too small to affect the world interest rate R∗, but a (country-
specific) spread, S, may exist over this rate: Rt = StR
∗
t . Hence, movements in R
can be traced back to movements in spreads and/or fluctuations in world interest
rates. The implicit assumption often used is that there is a large mass of foreign
7An alternative way to establish a connection between movements in R and investment decisions
is to assume that firms’ internal resources may not be enough to achieve the optimal level of
capital, in which case they need to resort to issuing debt in international markets (Fernández
and Gulan, 2015). In this setup, the resource constraint faced by the average entrepreneur is
qtkt+1 = nt+1 + d
f
t+1where k is the stock of capital purchased at price q; her net worth is n;
and df is the stock of debt issued in international markets at an interest rate R. Hence, changes
to external financial conditions that lead to upward movements of R will be correlated with a
slowdown in economic activity amid an investment slump, as entrepreneurs purchase less capital
to produce final goods.
8This can be modeled by assuming a sequential budget constraint of a typical consumer as
ct = d
h
t −Rt−1dht−1+wtht, where dht is the stock of (one period, non-state-contingent) debt issued in
period t and due in the next period, and c is the amount of consumption. The negative correlation
between changes in R and c could also be seen through the intertemporal Euler condition for
consumption, which relates present and future consumption, and interest rates.
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investors willing to lend to the emerging economy any amount at rate Rt. Loans to
the EME are risky assets because there can be default on payments to foreigners.
Time variation in this risk is captured by fluctuations in St. Variation in R
∗
t account
for changes in the risk aversion of foreign lenders/investors or movements in global
monetary/fiscal policies. This does not preclude the possibility that R∗ and S are
correlated. In fact, it can be the case that global events that affect the former (i.e.,
monetary or fiscal policy announcements in the United States) percolate into the
risk appetite of foreign investors for emerging market bonds, thereby affecting their
spreads, as has been empirically quantified (see Uribe and Yue, 2006).
When modeling the behavior of spreads (S) several alternatives have been con-
sidered in the literature. The most agnostic and reduced-form approach has been
to estimate a process for spreads by simply regressing them on (lagged) country
“fundamentals” such as output, investment, the trade balance and white noise per-
turbations, in the context of SVAR models (Uribe and Yue, 2006; Akinci, 2013). An
alternative semi-structural approach has been to directly postulate a link between
spreads and (latent or observed) country fundamentals included in the structural
model such as future expected productivity or the price of commodities exported
by the EME and then calibrate (or estimate) such linkages within the context of
the calibration (or estimation) of the full-blown dynamic general equilibrium model
(Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Chang and Fernández, 2013; Fernández et al., 2015a).
This captures the idea that productivity and/or commodity prices contain infor-
mation on the creditworthiness of the borrower EME to the extent that they are
92
a determinant of its repayment capacity.9 Lastly, other studies have resorted to a
full structural approach where S is endogenous to the financial contract stipulated
between domestic borrowers and external investors (Fernández and Gulan, 2015).
Under this approach, a financial accelerator endogenously generates a spread pro-
cess that depends upon financial variables, namely entrepreneurial leverage. Hence
domestic or external shocks that affect the value of entrepreneurs’ net worth will
influence spreads.10
Summing up, spreads on corporate bonds issued by firms in emerging market
on international capital markets ought to contain information on future economic
activity in these economies. Thus one would expect economic activity in EMEs to
be correlated with spreads over the business cycle. Moreover, perturbations to these
spreads that are orthogonal to current economic activity ought to have an impact
on future activity, mainly via their effect on aggregate investment and consumption.
In what follows we will formally explore the empirical validity of these hy-
potheses, first by constructing an external financial indicator that serves as proxy
for the behavior of S in several EMEs, using micro level data on international bond
9Formally, what has often been done is to postulate some ad hoc reduced-form equation
within the structural model whereby spreads react to other variables inside the model, e.g.,
St = η̃1EtTFPt+1 + η̃2EtP
co
t+1 + εt, where TFPt+1 and P
co
t+1 capture future productivity and
commodity prices; εt are exogenous and country-idiosyncratic perturbations to spreads; and the
η̃’s are reduced-form parameters that capture the elasticity of spreads with respect to these vari-
ables and are either estimated or calibrated to match some empirical regularities. Default decisions
are not directly modeled in this approach. The implicit and simplistic assumption made is that, as
in Kehoe and Perri (2004), private domestic borrowers always pay their obligations in full but that
in each period there is a probability that the local government will confiscate all interest payments
going from local borrowers to the foreign lenders. Fluctuations in the confiscation probability in a
particular economy are captured by the above equation, albeit in a reduced form.
10Formally, this is obtained by deriving the function S (•) which maps the value of net worth to
spreads, e.g., St = S (qtkt+1/nt+1), where qk is the market value of assets held by entrepreneurs in
EME and n is their equity. It is derived that S′ (•) > 0, which then implies that highly leveraged
entrepreneurs, when faced with a positive windfall (e.g., a boost in productivity), will de-leverage
on the margin, hence driving interest rates down and generating countercyclical interest rates.
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issuance by the corporate sector in these economies. We will then quantify the
degree of comovement between this index and economic activity. Finally, we will
measure the extent to which identified shocks to this indicator generate macroe-
conomic fluctuations in these economies. Before doing this, however, in the next
section we begin by documenting recent trends in access to international capital
markets by the corporate sector in EMEs.
2.3 External Corporate Borrowing in EMEs: Stylized Facts
The relevance of international financial factors for economic activity in emerg-
ing markets hinges, to a large extent, on the reliance on foreign debt by the corporate
sector in these economies. This section documents the considerable increase in ac-
cess to international capital markets, in particular through bond market, by the
corporate sector of 17 EMEs since the turn of the century.11
2.3.1 Sample of Countries and Data
When selecting the pool of EMEs to study we use three filters. First, we select
all economies that have been included in the most recent peer-reviewed studies
of EMEs’ business cycles, or that have been classified as emerging economies by
multilateral organizations or rating agencies.12 Second, we remove from this list
11The stylized facts that we document in terms of the patterns in external financing by EMEs
complement work by Shin (2014), Turner (2014) and Powell (2014) on how corporations from
emerging economies have stepped up their financing through international capital markets. A
recent paper by Gozzi et al. (2015) documents key characteristics of corporate bonds market in
EMEs.
12The academic studies that we use are Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Fernández and Gulan (2015), and Fernández et al., 2015a. The
multilateral organizations and rating agencies that we look at are i) the IMF; ii) MSCI; and iii)
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those countries where there was at least one episode of sovereign default since the
year 2000, as these may have caused important disruptions in the access to foreign
capital markets by the corporate sector. Third, we discard those countries that have
had a history of high pervasive capital controls.13 This process leaves us with a total
of 17 EMEs that can be split into four geographical regions:14
(i) Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
(ii) East Asia and Pacific: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thai-
land.
(iii) Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Russia, and Turkey.
(iv) Other Regions: South Africa and Israel.
For each of these economies we construct quarterly measures of corporate debt
in international capital markets. We use data on stocks and flows of corporate debt.
For stocks we use the data reported by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS).
For flows, or gross issuance, we construct a measure of new bond issuance using
information on the universe of bonds reported by Dealogic DCM, a leading data
provider that tracks global debt capital markets. We choose the period 2000-2014
JPMorgan.
13We use the recent index on de jure measures of capital controls by Fernández et al. (2015b),
which provides a quantitative measure of the existence of capital controls in both inflows and
outflows separately, across various asset categories, for 100 economies between 1995 and 2013. The
index is defined to be between zero (absence of controls in all asset categories) and one (controls in
all categories). We define a country as having had a history of high capital controls if the average
index over the 19 years is more than one and a half standard deviations above the median across
countries.
14Out of a total of 21 EMEs identified in the first filter, Argentina and Ecuador were removed
from the initial pool of economies as they experienced episodes of sovereign default within the
period analyzed (second filter). China and India were not considered because they surpass the
threshold of capital controls defined earlier (third filter).
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for our analysis to be consistent with the period where available data on corporate
bonds spreads exists, and that we later analyze.
2.3.2 Stylized Facts
The total stock of international corporate debt is presented in Figure 2.1. We
disaggregate the stocks between debt coming from international bond issuance and
that associated with cross-border bank loans. The upper plot aggregates debt across
all 17 EMEs considered, while the remaining four plots disaggregate the numbers
across the four geographical regions mentioned above. The numbers reported are
in current USD Billions. The data are taken from information on the BIS’ website
and is collected on a nationality basis.15 The stock of bond debt aggregates non-
financial corporates, banks and other financial institutions and excludes sovereign
bond issuance by construction. The stock of loan debt includes banks and non-
banks.16
The most salient stylized fact from Figure 2.1 is the considerable increase in the
stock of debt issued by EMEs’ corporations since the early 2000s, which quadrupled
15The nationality of a bond is based on the location of an issuer’s ultimate parent company,
while the residence of a bond is based on the location of the immediate issuer of a security. For
example, if a subsidiary of a Korean firm operating in the U.S. issues a bond, it is considered a
U.S. bond by residency, and a Korean bond by nationality. Shin (2014) and Turner (2014), among
others, suggest that debt on a nationality basis is more accurate than on a residence basis due to
the increase of debt issues by offshore affiliates of corporates in emerging markets.
16Although BIS data on cross-border bank loans do not decompose the stock of loans into private
sector and government, we assume in Figure 2.1 that cross-border bank loans to sovereigns of EMEs
are negligible. We double-checked this assumption based on data collected from national sources
for the largest five Latin American economies and found that for the period 2006-2014 the mean
ratio of cross-border loans made to governments to total cross-border loans was less than 1% (see
Table B.1 in Appendix B.2). In countries with higher levels of development of local bond markets,
such as Chile and Mexico, this figure is 0%. We feel it is safe to assume that this pattern is also
found in other emerging economies. Lastly, geographical aggregation of debt does not net out debt
with other EMEs in the sample.
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Notes: This figure shows the aggregate stock of private sector international debt for 17 emerging
economies (EMEs), decomposing the outstanding stock into cross-border bank loans and interna-
tional debt securities (bonds). The stock of securities is on a nationality basis. The private sector
includes all financial institutions and non-financial corporations. The regional aggregations are as
follows: East Asia and Pacific: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. East Europe
and Central Asia: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. Latin America: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Other Regions: South Africa, and Israel. The data are presented
in billions of current U.S. dollars and sourced from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics and BIS
Securities Statistics databases.
from an initial level of about 600 billion USD to 2.4 trillion USD by the end of 2014.
The sharpest increase started in the mid-2000s and suffered a reversal during the
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onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. That reversal was short-lived, however,
and the accumulation of debt continued with a vigorous pace afterwards. The other
remarkable stylized fact that emerges from Figure 2.1 is that the lion’s share of this
recent increase in corporate debt comes from bond issuance. Debt from loans also
increased, but less proportionately than that from new bond issuance. Finally, it is
also remarkable that these two stylized facts hold across all four geographical regions
considered.
Given the relative importance of bonds in the accumulation of debt in EMEs,
we turn to a closer look at bond issuance in Figure 2.2. It documents the value
of total corporate bond issuance over the sample period, in current U.S. dollars,
for each of the 17 EMEs considered. The figure divides gross bond issuance on a
nationality basis into domestic and international issuance. Aggregation is done using
transaction-level data for all bonds available.17 Again, the most salient stylized
fact that comes out of Figure 2.2 is that corporate bond issuance has increased
considerably since the early 2000s across all EMEs considered and, importantly, the
lion’s share of this increase comes from bonds issued in international markets. Even
though this trend started before the onset of the global financial crisis, most of the
expansion occurred afterwards.
In all Latin American countries there is a tendency for both domestic and in-
ternational bond issuance to increase since the early 2000s, but the trend post-crisis
accelerates most vigorously in the latter. In turn, the dominance of international
17Appendix B.1.1 contains further details on the criteria used when determining if a bond is
issued in foreign capital markets, and other details of the dataset. It also documents how the
stylized facts are, to a large degree, robust to measuring international bond issuance on a residence
basis.
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from Dealogic’s DCM database. See the Appendix for a description of how the country aggregates
are obtained from transaction-level data and for a definition of international and domestic debt
securities.
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issuance is much more marked for Eastern and Central European countries, where
issuance of domestic debt is virtually non-existent in most of the countries. This
contrasts with the case of most East Asian countries in our sample, where domes-
tic issuance accounts for the largest share. Nonetheless, for all countries in this
region we also observe a tendency for international issuance to increase its share,
particularly in the post-financial crisis period.
There are four additional stylized facts related to the issuance of debt securities
in EMEs that we summarize here but further document in Appendix B.2 for the
sake of space. First, by and large, international bond issuance has been a corporate
phenomenon, as sovereigns in EMEs have instead substituted foreign for domestic
financing.18 Second, the increase in international bond reliance by the corporate
sector has taken place with roughly the same strength in both financial and non-
financial corporations.19 Third, the vast majority of international bond issuance is
denominated in foreign currency, most of which is denominated in U.S. dollars (more
than 60 percent, on average) or other non-local currency (20 percent). Fourth, the
increase in foreign bond issuance by corporates in EMEs exceeds the recorded growth
in economic activity in the post-financial crisis period observed in these economies.
The ratios of gross bond issuance to GDP increased in most countries considered,
particularly since the onset of the global financial crisis.20
18A proper analysis of sovereign debt is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it ought to be
noted that this trend in sovereign bond issuance should not be taken as evidence that sovereigns
are more insulated from external financial shocks since, in some countries, international investors
are the majority holders of this locally-issued, locally-denominated debt.
19This is in line with the recent work of Cortina-Lorente et al. (2016), who document that 50
percent of bond issuance in developing countries is done by financial firms.
20Latin America, for example, had similar shares of gross bond issuance in both domestic and
international securities by 2008, on the order of 1 percentage point of GDP. By the end of our
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Summing up, the systematic analysis of a pool of 17 EMEs reveals that bond
issuance by corporations in these economies grew at a fast pace after the turn of the
century, mostly driven by issuance in foreign capital markets. This trend accelerated
after the Global Financial Crisis, and it was concentrated in bonds denominated in
foreign currency, mainly USD, outpacing growth in other external sources of finance
such as direct bank loans. This has led the stock of debt issued by corporates in these
EMEs to quadruple in little over a decade. In particular, in the four geographical
regions defined earlier, gross international corporate bond issuance as a share of
GDP has increased from 0.95% to 2.4% in East Asian and Pacific, 0.52% to 3.53%
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 0.88% to 2.09% in Latin America, and 0.34% to
1.58% in other regions between 2000Q1 and 2013Q2. Sovereigns, unlike corporates,
have moved away from issuing bonds in international markets and have relied more
on domestic markets as shown in Figure B.5.
2.4 An External Financial Indicator of Credit Spreads on Corporate
Bonds in Emerging Economies
2.4.1 Constructing an External Financial Indicator
We now describe the methodology and data sources that we use to construct
an external financial indicator for emerging economies based on the bonds issued
by their corporate sectors in international markets. We focus on these bonds since
sample, in 2014, this had tripled for the case of international bonds, while it remained constant
for domestic ones.
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our goal is to capture international financial forces that affect economic activity in
these economies.
We construct the external financial indicator for emerging economy k at quar-
ter t (EFIkt ) by taking a weighted average of option-adjusted spreads (OAS) across
a sample of bonds issued by the corporate sector of economy k. The concept of OAS
is suitable for our purpose because it provides a way to homogenize spreads across







where skit is the OAS for bond i at time t and w
k








where NBkt denotes the number of bonds issued by the corporate sector in economy
k whose OAS is available at time t, and BondSizeki refers to the size of bond i
measured in constant USD.
Because Dealogic, our data source for bond issuance presented in the previous
21The terminology “option” originally refers to the callability or puttability of the bond. The
concept of OAS is introduced to account for a potential stop of cash flow as a result of call and
put options being exercised. It also takes into account default risk since all possible future states
of cash flow are considered in calculating OAS. Formally, let rt and r
i,k
t denote, respectively, the
(time varying) yield curves of the safe asset and the bond i in economy k, so that skit = r
i,k
t − rt.
An OAS, skit, is computed after deriving r
i,k
t as a solution to the following equation (omitting the









1 + rτ + rit
)
where pit is the bid price of the risky bond i;
∏
(n) denotes the probability of nth path of the
economy being realized; M stands for maturity; and Ciτ (n) denotes the cash flow in the path n.
See O’Kane and Sen (2005) and Gabaix et al. (2007) for further explanations on the OAS.
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section, lacks information on OAS, we switch to Bloomberg when computing the
external financial indicator. This data provider contains OAS for a large pool of
bonds issued by corporates in emerging market economies since the late 1990s. When
choosing the sample of bonds to use in computing the external financial indicator
we follow a set of criteria. Among the universe of corporate bonds available in
Bloomberg, we choose only those with at least one observation for OAS at a quarterly
frequency over their lifetime. We also drop bonds from the sample if information is
not available on either date of issuance, bond size, industry that the issuer belongs
to, maturity date, or currency of denomination. Among this pool of bonds, we focus
only on USD-denominated corporate bonds that have been issued in foreign capital
markets.22,23
After dropping outliers (top and bottom 0.5 percentiles of OAS for the en-
tire sample of bond-quarter observations by country), we are left with a total
of 2,339 bonds and 23,791 (unbalanced) bond-quarter observations for the period
1999.Q2-2013.Q2 and across seven emerging economies: Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mex-
ico, Malaysia, Peru and Philippines. Among the countries considered in the previous
section, these were the ones for which at least one bond was observed for every quar-
22Due to lack of information on governing law and listing place for each bond in our Bloomberg
terminal, we used information on ISIN and issuer’s country of incorporation to make sure that
we kept only international debt securities in our sample. See Appendix B.1.1 for details on the
definition of international debt securities we use.
23Even though Bloomberg does not allow us to download data on the specific treasury used for
the OAS computation, we manually checked the Bloomberg screen for a selected number of bonds
and found that in all cases with available data it is a U.S. Treasury. We manually checked bonds
for all possible combinations of issuer’s country of incorporation, country where the bond ISIN
was assigned, and type of exchange where the bond is listed (unlisted or international, the latter
defined as an exchange different from the issuer’s country of incorporation). We checked a total
of 54 different bonds, which is the total number of combinations in our data. In all cases with
available data the specific treasury used for the OAS calculation was a U.S. Treasury (seven bonds
did not have information available).
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ter in the sample (we assigned countries based on issuer’s country of incorporation).
The summary statistics of the dataset used to construct the external financial
indicators are presented in Table 2.1. The average number of bonds per quarter
across all countries is just under 400, and differs between countries. Brazil, Mexico,
Korea and Chile exhibit the largest shares of the bonds considered, ranging between
185 to 1,061 bonds. In contrast, Malaysia, Peru and Philippines, have less than
a hundred different bonds. In all countries, the number of bond-quarter observa-
tions remains stable until 2009 and then increases until the end of the sample (not
reported).24
The size of bond in Table 2.1 refers to total proceeds (i.e., the dollar amount
raised by the firm by issuing the bond). The average size is $329 million but the size
distribution is highly (positively) skewed, akin to that documented in Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek (2012) for U.S. corporate bonds. Maturity at issue and terms to maturity
respectively represent years left to maturity at issue date and at the observation
date. The mean is close to seven years for both variables. On average, these are two
to three years shorter than the case for the U.S. reported in Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012). Arguably, this reflects the ability of U.S. firms to issue bonds at longer
maturities than firms in EMEs, and it also echoes the findings of Broner et al.
(2013) who document that EMEs tend to borrow short term.
The mean OAS spread is 370 basis points (bp) for the sample period, and it is
positively skewed, with a large standard deviation of 420 bp. The same pattern is
24Figure B.8 in Appendix B.2 presents evidence that the subsample of bonds with OAS data is
representative of the universe of bonds studied in Section 2.3.
104
Table 2.1: Dataset on Corporate Bond Spreads from Emerging Economics: Sum-
mary Statistics
Country N. Bonds N. Obs. Statistics Mean SD Min Median Max
All Countries 2339 23791 Number of bonds per quarter 394.96 201.92 176.00 324.00 1153.00
Size of bond ($ mil) 329.30 375.58 0.10 236.12 3037.77
Maturity at issue (years) 6.94 7.54 0.08 5.50 100.08
Term to maturity (years) 6.48 8.19 0.00 4.50 96.25
OAS spread (basis point) 370.52 420.93 27.24 254.94 5685.23
Brazil 1061 6666 Number of bonds per quarter 116.95 72.11 57.00 92.00 509.00
Size of bond ($ mil) 183.18 291.15 0.10 68.71 1814.23
Maturity at issue (years) 3.93 4.07 0.08 2.00 30.00
Term to maturity (years) 3.84 3.54 0.00 2.75 30.25
OAS spread (basis point) 471.29 510.36 33.50 342.90 5685.23
Chile 185 3186 Number of bonds per quarter 55.89 30.84 14.00 51.00 132.00
Size of bond ($ mil) 416.61 218.31 4.71 406.82 1185.77
Maturity at issue (years) 11.68 11.13 1.00 10.00 100.08
Term to maturity (years) 8.65 10.35 0.00 6.50 96.25
OAS spread (basis point) 249.33 143.52 27.24 229.28 1497.09
Korea 390 5170 Number of bonds per quarter 90.70 52.60 35.00 78.00 221.00
Size of bond ($ mil) 395.44 309.93 4.20 347.65 2053.47
Maturity at issue (years) 6.74 6.93 0.50 5.00 100.00
Term to maturity (years) 5.57 8.08 0.00 3.75 93.25
OAS spread (basis point) 209.78 130.03 36.18 186.43 1017.10
Malaysia 79 1704 Number of bonds per quarter 29.89 7.16 9.00 31.00 41.00
Size of bond ($ mil) 704.04 580.43 59.76 524.15 3037.77
Maturity at issue (years) 13.45 15.64 2.00 10.00 100.00
Term to maturity (years) 10.75 14.98 0.00 6.50 95.25
OAS spread (basis point) 211.67 203.68 37.64 177.09 2495.75
Mexico 485 5477 Number of bonds per quarter 96.09 43.67 51.00 77.00 211.00
Size of bond ($ mil) 493.93 477.60 0.19 333.77 2963.59
Maturity at issue (years) 10.00 6.56 0.75 9.50 32.00
Term to maturity (years) 7.71 6.59 0.00 6.25 32.00
OAS spread (basis point) 507.95 569.53 27.90 333.59 5415.02
Peru 60 310 Number of bonds per quarter 5.44 10.10 1.00 1.00 52.00
Size of bond ($ mil) 380.66 198.62 70.44 307.34 800.44
Maturity at issue (years) 9.12 3.35 3.50 10.00 25.00
Term to maturity (years) 7.36 3.42 0.75 7.38 25.00
OAS spread (basis point) 430.75 256.92 84.28 347.20 1496.38
Philippines 79 1278 Number of bonds per quarter 22.42 4.57 14.00 22.00 31.00
Size of bond ($ mil) 336.25 243.70 113.35 274.86 1184.59
Maturity at issue (years) 10.38 11.58 2.00 8.50 100.00
Term to maturity (years) 7.32 8.95 0.00 5.00 88.50
OAS spread (basis point) 405.47 219.87 55.16 356.61 1998.70
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the bonds in our dataset. The columns N. of Bonds
and N. of Obs. report the number of bonds and the number of OAS-quarter observations in the
sample for each country for the entire sample period of 1999.Q2-2013.Q2, respectively. Number of
bonds per quarter refers to the number of bonds with an OAS observation at a given quarter. Size
of bond is measured in real U.S. dollars (2010.Q3 = 100). OAS spread is the option-adjusted spread
of a bond in basis points at a given quarter. Maturity at issue refers to the remaining years of a
bond from its issuance date to its maturity date. Terms to maturity refers to the remaining years of
the bond from a given quarter to its maturity date. We exclude from the sample OAS observations
that are below (above) the country-specific 0.5th (99.5th) percentiles of OAS-quarter observations of
all USD denominated bonds available in Bloomberg for the country (including sovereign bonds).
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observed across all seven countries in the sample, although considerable differences
in the average OAS can be seen. Mexico and Brazil are the countries with the
highest average OAS, 508 bp and 471 bp, respectively, while Chile (249 bp) and
Korea (210 bp) exhibit the lowest levels, nearly half of those in Brazil and Mexico.
2.4.2 Dynamics of the External Financial Indicator
We now document the time series dynamics of the external financial indicators
constructed, paying close attention to their comovement with real economic activity.
The left column in Figure 2.3 plots, for each of the seven countries considered, the
time series of EFI together with real annual GDP growth, during the sample period
1999.Q2-2013.Q2. The two variables exhibit negative comovement. This pattern is
most evident during the fall in economic activity around the global financial crisis of
2008/9 and the subsequent recovery. The crisis period was characterized by spikes in
all the EFIs. It is also noteworthy that our series of EFI fell to near pre-crisis levels
as the EMEs in the sample recovered from the crisis. The negative comovement is
also observed before the crisis in most countries, when these economies experienced
sustained economic growth for several years while simultaneously our measure of
EFI displayed long and protracted reductions.25
The degree of cyclicality of our measures of EFI is further assessed by comput-






for j = −4,−3, ..., 4; where ∆GDP kt is real annual GDP growth in economy k and
25Peru is a notable exception, though. This country’s EFI remained flat for most of the episode
prior to the crisis of 2008/9. This could partly reflect the lack of a well-established market of
foreign bonds in this country during this period, as was documented in the previous section.
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Figure 2.3: Real GDP and the External Financial Indicator
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corr(Yt, EFIt+j)
95% C.I
Notes: These figures show the time series dynamics of the external financial indicators (EFI) we
construct for each country in our sample with corporate spreads data and their comovement with
real economic activity. The left column presents the time series of EFI in levels (diamond/red)
and of the annual real GDP growth rate (solid/black), both at a quarterly frequency. The right
column presents the correlation between real GDP growth and changes in EFI at different lags
(corr (∆GDPt, ∆EFIt+j)) for j = −4, · · · , 4. Red dotted lines represent a 95% confidence interval.
The sample period is 1999.Q2-2013.Q2.
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∆EFIkt+j is the (annual) first difference in EFI
k. The results of this exercise are
reported in the right column of Figure 2.3. They indicate that EFI is a leading
indicator of economic activity, as the correlation exhibits its trough when j < 0,, i.e.,
economic activity today co-moves the most, and in opposite direction, with lagged
changes in EFI.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the EFIs exhibit a strong comovement among
themselves. In fact, the first principal component of the seven indicators accounts
for 73 percent of the sample variance. Likewise, growth in the emerging markets
considered also exhibits strong comovement: 65 percent of the sample variance is
associated with the first principal component. We interpret this as evidence that
EFI captures global financial forces that affect real economic activity in emerging
economies. Later we will formally test this interpretation.
2.5 The External Financial Indicator and Economic Activity
The evidence presented so far is consistent with the hypothesis that spreads on
bonds issued by corporates of EMEs in international capital markets have informa-
tion on aggregate economic activity which would explain the negative comovement
observed between the two variables over the business cycle. We turn now to a
more formal analysis of this hypothesis by quantifying the information content and
predictive ability of credit spreads of these bonds on economic activity. We will
also evaluate the hypothesis that exogenous perturbations to these spreads have an
impact on future economic activity.
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2.5.1 Forecasting Information Content of the External Financial In-
dicator
When assessing the information content and predictive ability of credit spreads
of corporate bonds issued in international markets for economic activity in emerging
economies, we extend Gilchrist and Zakrajsek’s (2012) forecasting specification to
a multi-country panel setting. Formally, we estimate a dynamic balanced panel
regression of real GDP growth against changes in EFI:









t +εk,t+h, for h ≥ 1 (2.3)
where k denotes each of the seven emerging economies considered, k = 1, ..., 7;
and h ≥ 1 is the forecast horizon. In our benchmark specification we fix h = 1, but
later consider alternative values. Variables ∆EFI and ∆GDP are annual changes
in EFI and the (log of) real GDP, respectively.26 We set the lag length equal to one
(p = 0), although we later explore a richer lag specification structure as a robustness
check. The estimation period starts in 1999.Q2, when our EFI series begin, and
ends in 2013.Q2.
We estimate the dynamic panel regression with country fixed effects (αk) and
use sets of controls that are country-specific (Ω̃k) and global (Ω). The choice of
controls is motivated by the literature on drivers of economic activity in emerg-
26We will refer to annual real GDP growth and ∆GDP interchangeably from now on.
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ing economies (see the Introduction). In particular, guided by previous studies on
the role of global factors when accounting for economic activity in EMEs, we in-
clude in Ω two variables that are common across the seven countries and that aim
at capturing the role of foreign factors beyond those already captured in changes
of EFI: (annual) changes in term spreads of 3-month and 10-year U.S. Treasury
yields, ∆USY ield Curve, and (annual) changes in the real U.S. Federal Funds Rate,
∆RFFt.
27 These two were included in Gilchrist and Zakrajsek’s (2012) original spec-
ification for the U.S. economy as domestic controls. In terms of the country-specific
controls, we include in Ω̃k a measure of the domestic monetary policy stance by
including the (annual) change in the policy rate in real terms, ∆RLocalRate, and
(annual) changes to a country-specific commodity price index that uses as weights
the share of the commodities exported by each emerging economy relative to total
exports, deflated by the U.S. CPI, ∆RPcom.28 Thus, our framework examines the
marginal information content of credit spreads, as proxied by EFI, conditional on
the stance of external and domestic monetary policies as well as real shocks coming
from commodity exports.29
We estimate the model using a Least Square Dummy Variable estimator
(LSDV). The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 2.2. Numbers in parenthe-
27US Y ieldCurve = 10-year U.S. Treasury rate − 3-month U.S. Treasury rate
28∆RPcom is computed by weighting the international prices of 44 distinct commodities in
international markets by country-specific (constant) weights computed as each country’s share in
the country’s total commodity exports. The source (and motivation) for using ∆RPcom comes
from Fernández et al. (2015a) who argue that exogenous fluctuations in the price of commodities
that emerging economies export are an important driver of their business cycles. See this work for
further details on the construction of this variable.
29It may be argued that more variables could be added to model 2.3 in order to enhance the
forecasting ability of our specification (e.g., industrial production). Such task, however, is not the
aim of this investigation. Instead, our goal is to assess the information that the external financial
indicator contains over and above a set of standard macro variables.
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sis are t-statistics adjusted for standard errors clustered by country. The columns re-
port results according to 5 alternative specifications that vary according to the set of
controls used. In the first column, no controls are used. The second column reports
results where we add the two global controls, Ωt = [∆USY ield Curvet; ∆RFFt].
The third and fourth specifications are reported in the next two columns where
we sequentially include the two domestic controls without global controls, Ω̃kt =
[∆RLocalRatek,t] and Ω̃
k
t = [∆RPcomk,t], respectively. The final specification re-
ported in the last column reports results when all controls are included.
Our proxy for global financial conditions for emerging economies, ∆EFI, is
a statistically significant predictor of economic activity in these countries. The
coefficient associated with this variable is estimated to be negative and statisti-
cally significant at 5 percent significance level in all five specifications considered.
Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient implies a strong and negative
relationship between contemporaneous values of changes in EFI and future real
output growth. According to the estimated coefficient from the last specification
considered, γ̂ = −0.000022, an increase in EFI of 100 basis points in the current
quarter is correlated with a reduction of 0.22 percentage points in the output growth
rate in the next quarter. This is a considerable reduction considering that such an
increase is common in the data (e.g., a one standard deviation movement in ∆EFI
is 195 basis points).
The two external controls, ∆USY ield Curvet and ∆RFFt, are significant
when added alone in Spec. 2 and when added jointly with the two country-specific
controls in Spec. 5. Moreover, both have positive coefficients, which we interpret
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Table 2.2: Panel Forecasting Regression
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
∆GDPt 0.75
∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(28.32) (22.59) (28.70) (14.34) (21.42)
∆EFIt -0.000029
∗∗ -0.000027∗∗ -0.000028∗∗ -0.000025∗∗ -0.000022∗∗
(-3.30) (-3.35) (-3.66) (-2.72) (-2.97)











Adjusted R2 0.681 0.704 0.686 0.688 0.718
Observations 371 371 371 371 371
Notes: This table presents the benchmark results of country fixed-effect panel regressions. The
dependent variable is the one-quarter ahead annual real GDP growth rate at a quarterly frequency
(∆GDPt+1). ∆EFI (measured in basis points) refers to annual changes in the external financial
indicator. ∆US Y ield (measured in percentage points) represents annual changes in the term spreads
of 3-month and 10-year US treasuries. ∆RFF (measured in percentage points) is the annual change
in the real Federal Funds rate, which is the effective nominal Federal Funds rate minus U.S. CPI
inflation. ∆RLocal Rate (measured in percentage points) is the annual change in the domestic real
monetary policy rate (which is computed as the domestic nominal policy rate minus the domestic
inflation rate). We use as a proxy for the policy rate the money market rate or the monetary-
policy-related interest rate. ∆RPcom refers to annual changes in the composite commodity index
of Fernández et al. (2015a) (see Footnote 28 in the text for details on the construction of this
index). The sample includes 7 emerging economies (Brazil, Chile, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines) and the period of analysis is 1999.Q2-2013.Q2. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
adjusted for standard errors clustered by country. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗
indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
as coming from the fact that monetary policy in the U.S. is countercyclical (i.e.,
interest rates increase to smooth stronger economic activity), which has positive
spillovers for emerging economies. Neither of the country-specific controls is signifi-
cant when added separately in Specs. 3 and 4. Only ∆RPcomk,t is significant when
estimated with all other controls in Spec. 5, in which case it has a positive coeffi-
cient, indicating that periods of high commodity prices are correlated with increases
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in macroeconomic activity.
2.5.2 Macroeconomic Effects of Shocks to the External Financial In-
dicator
We turn now to examining the dynamic macroeconomic consequences of shocks
to EFI in the EMEs considered. We do so by running a simple bivariate panel
structural vector autoregressive model (see Love and Zicchino, 2006 and Abrigo and
Love, 2016) of output growth and changes in EFI. Formally, the SVAR model is
AYt = C + B1Yt−1 + ...+ BpYt−p + Φt (2.4)
where Yt is a 2Kx1 vector that collects all pairs of real output growth (∆GDP )
and changes in EFI (∆EFI) across the K emerging economies; C is a vector of
constants with country fixed effects; Φt is a vector of i.i.d. errors with mean zero and
variance-covariance Θ, and matrix A captures the contemporaneous linkages across
the variables, which we construct in a way that allows us to identify the shocks to
∆EFI. In particular, we assume that shocks to ∆EFI affect output growth only
with a lag, while shocks to this variable may impact ∆EFI contemporaneously and
also note that shocks to output may affect ∆EFI immediately. This identification
strategy has been used by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) for the case of the United
States, and in the context of EMEs by Uribe and Yue (2006).30 This implies that the
30This identification strategy is rooted in the realistic assumption that financial variables (e.g.,
asset prices) react faster than real variables (e.g., production and investment decisions) due to
various adjustment costs. Using this identifying assumption also allows our results to be compared
more easily with previous studies.
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main diagonal of A is a sequence of 2x2 lower triangular matrices. Finally, we set
the lag length p to one. A robustness section will later consider alternative timing
identification assumptions as well as different lag specifications.31
The left panel in Figure 2.4 depicts the impulse response function of output
growth to an orthogonalized shock in ∆EFIt derived from the estimated panel
SVAR. An unanticipated increase of one standard deviation in the orthogonal com-
ponent of this variable, roughly 150 basis points, causes a protracted fall of output
growth. Indeed, the macroeconomic consequences of this adverse financial shock are
substantial: output growth falls as much as 0.75 percentage points one year after
the shock when it reaches its trough. After that, growth gradually recovers and
returns to its long-run mean six quarters ahead.
Another result that we derive from the estimated SVAR model is the forecast
error variance decomposition (FEVD) for real output growth, depicted in the right
panel of Figure 2.4. The share of the FEVD of output accounted by shocks to ∆EFI
converges to 35 percent as the time horizon increases beyond one and a half years.
This number is considerably higher than those from previous studies that quantified
the role of risk premia shocks for emerging economies’ business cycles that ranged
between 12 and 15 percent (Uribe and Yue, 2006; Akinci, 2013). A key difference
between these previous studies and ours is that they rely on measures of sovereign
31A potential concern emanating from the type of fixed effect panel VAR that we use here is
the inconsistency of the least squares parameter estimates. Such bias, however, has been shown to
decrease as the time dimension gets large (Judson and Owen, 1999), as in our empirical exercise.
Still, we tested how robust our panel forecasting estimates are using the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
The results are reported in Table B.3 in Appendix B.2 and are qualitatively similar to those found
in our benchmark case.
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Figure 2.4: Panel VAR Impulse Response and Variance Decomposition of Real GDP
Growth Rate
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Notes: This figure presents the impulse response function and the forecast error variance decom-
position of the bivariate panel VAR model. The left panel presents the impulse response function
of annual real GDP growth rate to a 1 standard deviation shock in ∆EFI. Red dotted lines rep-
resent a 95% confidence interval calculated using 500 draws of Monte Carlo simulations. The right
panel shows the forecast error decomposition of the real GDP growth rate associated with shocks to
∆EFI.
risk, unlike ours, which focuses on corporate risk.32
Summing up, the two methodologies employed so far, forecasting panel re-
gressions and panel SVAR, have provided evidence that supports the hypotheses
that spreads on bonds issued by corporates of EMEs in international capital mar-
kets have information on aggregate economic activity in these economies, and that
exogenous perturbations to these spreads do have an impact on future economic
activity. These results, we conjecture, are related to the considerable increase in
foreign bond issuance by the private sector of EMEs, which we documented in the
32The SVAR in Uribe and Yue (2006) includes a larger vector of variables than the two that
we analyze here (particularly investment, the trade balance and the foreign interest rate). Figure
B.9 in Appendix B.2 presents the results when this larger model is run. They are quite similar to
those found for the simpler bivariate VAR. The work by Akinci (2013) includes, in addition to the
variables in Uribe and Yue (2006), the VIX. We will also examine this case in one of the extensions
below.
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previous section. We next consider extensions of our empirical explorations as well
as various robustness tests.
2.6 Extensions and Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Aggregate Consumption and Investment
As was described in Section 2, the literature has postulated two reasons why
agents in EMEs may borrow funds from world capital markets. One is associated
with factors that affect the level of aggregate investment while the other relates to
forces that shape aggregate consumption. Hence the response of these two macroe-
conomic variables represent two channels, mutually non-exclusive, through which
international financial shocks can affect aggregate economic activity in EMEs. In
this section we extend our analysis by quantifying the degree of responsiveness of
consumption and investment following shocks to ∆EFI. We do so by including
these two variables in the SVAR characterized in equation (2.4) and deriving the
impulse response functions in the expanded model. Our identification scheme re-
mains the same in that we assume that shocks to ∆EFI affect real variables with
a lag.
Results of this extension are reported in Figure 2.5. The upper panels of the
figure display the impulse response functions for real growth in output, consumption
and investment following a one S.D. shock in ∆EFI. The lower panels report the
variance decomposition for each of these variables. There is evidence that both
consumption and investment react to a positive shock to ∆EFI by falling below
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their average mean growth. In terms of the variance decomposition for consumption,
23 percent of consumption variance is accounted for by perturbation in EFI at
medium-term horizons, above that of investment, which is 18 percent. Lastly, the
share of variance in real output growth remains around 35 percent, as was found in
the benchmark case.
Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses from Expanded Panel SVAR
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Notes: This figure summarizes impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions
of the expanded panel VAR model including {∆GDPi,t,∆CONSi,t,∆INVi,t,∆EFIi,t}. The top
row presents an impulse response function of annual real GDP, consumption and investment growth
rates to a 1 standard deviation shock to ∆EFI. Red dotted lines represent a 95% confidence
interval calculated using 500 draws of Monte Carlo simulations. The bottom row presents forecast
error decompositions of real GDP, consumption and investment growth rates associated with shocks
to ∆EFI. The green-triangle dotted lines represent bivariate panel VAR results from Figure 2.4.
The Malaysian sample starts in 2005.Q1 due to data availability on investment.
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2.6.2 Sovereign Risk
A potentially valid critique of our approach is that the real effects of external
financial factors that we associate with corporate credit spreads in EMEs may be
influenced by sovereign risk. As argued before, our focus on corporate risk in these
economies comes from the stylized fact, presented in Section 2.3, that the large
expansion of international bond issuance in EMEs since the early 2000s has mainly
been concentrated in the corporate sector, not in the public sector. Still, it could be
argued that the longstanding history of serial default by some EMEs may continue
to make international investors wary of potential spillovers from sovereign risk to
corporate risk. Such spillovers can arise if, for example, sovereign risk increases
due to a rising public deficit, which then increases the probability that governments
increase tax rates on the corporate sector or even expropriate private assets, raising
their cost of borrowing in foreign markets.33 Recently, Akinci (2013) found that
shocks to the sovereign risk premia, proxied by JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets
Bond Index (EMBI), explained about 15 percent of business cycles in emerging
economies, in line with earlier estimates from Uribe and Yue (2006) of about 12
percent.
To address this critique, in this subsection we assess how robust our benchmark
33This is just one of the many channels that may deliver a connection between sovereign and
corporate risk. Another channel has been recently analyzed formally by D’Erasmo et al. (2013),
where increases in sovereign risk constrain banks’ ability to extend credit to firms because their
balance sheet weakens as they hold sovereign bonds as part of their assets. Of course, the causality
may go the other way around as well (i.e., from corporate to sovereign risk). The case of several
crises in Asia in the 1990s (e.g., Korea) and the more recent experience in Ireland or Spain show
how the deterioration of corporate balance sheets may turn into higher sovereign risk as the public
sector absorbs much of the private illiquid debts. Our robustness check ought to be seen just as a
crude first approximation to disentangling the links between corporate and sovereign risk.
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results are when we include the country ∆EMBI in the forecasting panel regressions
and panel SVARs. The results of the new panel regression are reported in the upper
panel of Table 2.3, where we reproduce the same five specifications of Table 2.2. The
results are virtually identical to the benchmark case. The coefficient associated with
the change in EFI continues to be negative, large in absolute value, and statistically
significant at 5 percent. The coefficient of ∆EMBI is positive but not significant
at a 5 percent significance level in any of the five specifications considered. In an
alternative specification when EFI is turned off (last column in Table 2.3, upper
panel) and only EMBI remains, its coefficient changes sign but continues not to be
significant.34
The new panel SVAR that we run now includes ∆EMBI in addition to ∆GDP
and ∆EFI. We assume that shocks to EMBI can contemporaneously affect EFI
but not vice versa. The impulse response of output growth from an identified one
S.D. shock to ∆EFI in this expanded panel SVAR is reported in the top left panel
of Figure 2.6. For the sake of comparison the figure also plots the response in the
benchmark specification. The results continue to point to the same direction as those
in the benchmark; an identified shock to ∆EFI generates a large and protracted
fall in economic activity. Output growth falls as much as 0.6 percentage points three
quarters after the shock when it reaches its trough. After that, growth gradually
recovers and returns to its long-run mean approximately 8 quarters later. The
dynamics track closely those in the benchmark impulse response. The bottom left
34We also take an alternative approach to control for sovereign risk using a principal component
analysis. The coefficient associated with the change in EFI continues to be negative, large in
absolute value, and statistically significant at 5 percent. See Appendix B.3 for details of the result.
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Table 2.3: Panel Results Controlling for Sovereign Risk and Foreign Investors’ Risk
Aversion
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 w.o EFI
Panel A. Controlling for sovereign risk
∆GDPt 0.76∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(27.71) (21.82) (29.48) (11.61) (16.93) (18.17)
∆EFIt -0.000035∗∗ -0.000035∗∗∗ -0.000034∗∗ -0.000028∗∗ -0.000027∗∗
(-3.29) (-4.36) (-3.06) (-3.08) (-4.01)
∆EMBIt 0.000010 0.000012 0.0000094 0.0000097 0.000012 -0.000012
(0.56) (0.82) (0.51) (0.61) (0.88) (-1.31)
∆US Y ieldCurvet 0.0023 0.0028∗ 0.0027∗
(1.78) (2.17) (2.04)
∆RFFt 0.0023∗ 0.0022∗ 0.0023∗
(2.20) (2.34) (2.18)
∆RLocal Ratet 0.00072 0.00040 0.00043
(1.18) (0.66) (0.67)
∆RPcomt 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(3.33) (4.05) (4.24)
Adjusted R2 0.685 0.704 0.690 0.704 0.726 0.707
Observations 317 317 317 317 317 317
Panel B. Controlling for foreign investors’ risk aversion
∆GDPt 0.72∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(15.40) (17.44) (16.27) (10.09) (13.69) (13.93)
∆EFIt -0.000019∗∗∗ -0.000020∗∗∗ -0.000019∗∗∗ -0.000017∗∗∗ -0.000018∗∗∗
(-5.98) (-8.94) (-5.64) (-5.29) (-7.07)
∆EMBIt 0.0000099 0.000012∗ 0.0000094 0.0000096 0.000011 -0.0000014
(1.22) (2.07) (1.03) (1.11) (1.67) (-0.30)
∆V IXt -0.00053∗∗ -0.00050∗∗∗ -0.00050∗∗ -0.00042∗∗ -0.00036∗∗ -0.00049∗∗
(-3.83) (-4.37) (-3.66) (-2.73) (-2.70) (-3.76)
∆US Y ieldCurvet 0.0023 0.0027∗ 0.0026∗
(1.90) (2.11) (2.06)
∆RFFt 0.0021∗ 0.0021∗ 0.0021∗
(2.39) (2.43) (2.38)
∆RLocal Ratet 0.00048 0.00027 0.00024
(0.84) (0.45) (0.38)
∆RPcomt 0.013∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(2.75) (3.50) (3.92)
Adjusted R2 0.709 0.725 0.710 0.717 0.735 0.729
Observations 317 317 317 317 317 317
Notes: This table shows results of country-fixed effect panel regression controlling for sovereign
risk and foreign investors’ risk aversion. Panel A reproduces the results of the five specifications in
Table 2.2 adding ∆EMBIt as an additional control variable for sovereign risk. Panel B reproduces
the results in Table 2.2 adding both ∆EMBIt and ∆V IXt, the latter as a control for foreign
investors’ risk appetite. In both panels the last column drops the covariate for ∆EFI. In both panels
the dependent variable is the annual real GDP growth rate at a quarterly frequency (∆GDPt+1).
∆EFI refers to annual changes in the external financial indicator. ∆US Y ield represents annual
changes in the term spreads of 3-month and 10-year US treasuries. ∆RFF is the annual changes
in the real Federal Funds rate, which is the effective nominal Federal Funds Rate minus U.S. CPI
inflation. ∆RLocal Rate is the annual changes in the domestic real monetary policy rate. ∆RPcom
refers to annual changes in the composite commodity index of Fernández et al. (2015a). The baseline
sample includes 7 emerging economies (Brazil, Chile, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines)
and the period 1999.Q2-2013.Q2, but in these tables the 1999.Q2 observation for Chile and all
observations for Korea are dropped because of lack of EMBI data. Numbers in parentheses are
t-statistics adjusted for standard errors clustered by country. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent
level, ∗∗ indicates significance at a 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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panel in Figure 2.6 also presents the results in terms of FEVD for real output growth.
The share of the FEVD of output accounted for by shocks to ∆EFI converges to
20 percent as the time horizon increases beyond one and a half years. This is close
to half the share obtained in the benchmark case.35
Overall, the results are robust to accounting for the possible role that sovereign
risk may be playing in driving the dynamics of the external financial indicator. The
macroeconomic effects are pervasive although marginally smaller. We interpret this
as complementary evidence to that presented in previous studies that argue for
a large role of sovereign risk when accounting for economic activity in emerging
economies. Our results point to the relevance of shocks to the corporate risk premia
as an additional source of fluctuations in real economic activity.
2.6.3 The VIX and Foreign Investors’ Risk Aversion
In an influential work, Rey (2013) identified the V IX–a measure of uncertainty
and risk aversion coming from the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options–
as a variable that co-moves strongly with a global financial cycle in cross border
capital flows. Moreover, Akinci (2013) finds that shocks to the V IX account for
about 20 percent of movements in aggregate economic activity in a pool of emerging
economies. Motivated by these works, in this section we explore to what extent
movements in EFI are capturing changes in foreign investors’ risk appetite that
previous works have proxied by the V IX when quantifying the effects of these
35Appendix B.2 presents results when an alternative ordering is used such that shocks to EFI
can affect EMBI contemporaneously but not vice versa. For that case the results are even more
similar to our benchmark results.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Controlling for Sovereign Risk and Foreign Investors’
Risk Aversion
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Notes: This figure summarizes impulse response functions and forecast error variance decomposi-
tions of the panel VAR models after controlling for sovereign and external risks. The first column
shows results from a trivariate panel VAR model including {∆GDPi,t,∆EMBIi,t,∆EFIi,t} as en-
dogenous variables. The second column shows results from a trivariate panel VAR model including
{∆GDPi,t,∆EMBIi,t,∆EFIi,t} as endogenous variables, and {∆V IXt} as an exogenous variable.
The top row presents the impulse response function of annual real GDP growth to a 1 standard
deviation shock to ∆EFI. Red dotted lines represent a 95% confidence interval calculated using
500 draws of Monte Carlo simulations. The bottom row presents the forecast error decomposition
of real GDP associated with shocks to ∆EFI. Green-triangle dotted lines represent results from
Figure 2.4. Korea is excluded due to data availability on sovereign risk (EMBI). 1999.Q2 EMBI
observation for Chile is dropped due to EMBI data availability.
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changes in emerging economies. We address this question by including the V IX in
the panel forecasting regressions and panel SVARs (already controlling for EMBI,
as we do in the previous section).
The results of the new panel regression are reported in the lower panel of
Table 2.3 where, again, we reproduce the same five specifications that we originally
considered in Table 2.2. The coefficient associated with ∆EFI in Spec. 5, γ̂ =
−0.000018, falls relative to the benchmark (−0.000022) but remains statistically
significant (at a 1 percent confidence level), as is the (negative) coefficient associated
with the V IX.36 In an additional experiment that we run, in the last column of
that table, we remove EFI from the set of regressors. For that case, the coefficient
associated with the V IX increases in absolute terms by nearly 40 percent.
The new panel SVAR that we run now includes ∆V IXt as an exogenous
variable in addition to ∆GDP,∆EMBI and ∆EFI. The impulse response of output
growth from an identified one S.D. shock to ∆EFI in this expanded panel SVAR is
reported in the top right panel of Figure 2.6. Again, for the sake of comparison, the
figure also plots the response in the benchmark specification. The results continue
to point to the same direction as those in the benchmark: an identified shock to
∆EFI generates a fall in economic activity. Output growth falls but the magnitude
of the fall is considerably reduced vis-à-vis the benchmark case. Output growth falls
as much as 0.25 percentage points two quarters after the shock when it reaches its
trough. Hence the trough is about 1/3 that of the benchmark specification.
The results of the variance decomposition for output growth go in the same
36The standard deviation of the change in the V IX is 10.3.
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direction (bottom right panel in Figure 2.6). The share of the FEVD of output
growth accounted by shocks to ∆EFI converges to about 8 percent, about a fourth
of that in the benchmark case.
Overall, the results point to a crucial role of global risk appetite shifts in driving
the macroeconomic effects of changes in EFI, which we view as complementary to
Rey (2013) and Akinci (2013). This is mostly manifested in the dynamic responses
of economic activity to shocks in this variable when controlling for endogenous
responses to V IX fluctuations. Likewise, shocks to EFI, once V IX is taken into
account, account for a much smaller variance share of output growth. Still, it is
noteworthy that a non-trivial dynamic response of output growth continues to come
from independent fluctuations in EFI. We view this as evidence that our external
financial index does indeed capture external forces that affect economic activity in
EMEs that are intrinsic to these economies, above and beyond global changes in
investors’ risk appetite.37
2.6.4 Alternative Filtering
Our benchmark results are computed using variables that are expressed in
growth rates (or annual differences for spreads and interest rates). This is reasonable
to the extent that growth rates are a simple and tractable measure of changes
37Table B.6 in Appendix B.2 contains further experiments where we include other observed
external forces that may proxy for the global financial cycle, namely U.S. GDP growth. We
find this variable not to have any explanatory value beyond that of the other controls. We also
experimented by adding quarter-time fixed effects, which renders EFI no longer statistically and
economically significant (although only for h = 1). We view this as additional evidence that EFI
is capturing, although imperfectly, a financial common factor that is absorbed by the time fixed
effect and materializes in a strong comovement across the EFIs.
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in economic activity and foreign financial conditions. Yet, strictly speaking, first
differencing is not a transformation that allows one to distinguish between trend
and cyclical components of the variables considered, the latter being often the main
object of analysis when thinking about changes in economic activity in the literature
(see Introduction). We now assess the robustness of the benchmark results when
variables are detrended in levels. For this purpose we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter,
a commonly used detrending procedure in business cycle analysis.38
The upper panel of Table 2.4 reports the panel regression results with this
alternative filter. All variables have been detrended using a smoothing parameter
equal to 1, 600. The table reproduces the same columns reported in our benchmark
case (Table 2.2). The results are both qualitatively and quantitatively robust. The
estimated coefficient for EFI is now γ̂ = −0.000019 for Specification 5, very close to
the benchmark, and statistically significant at 10 percent. Figure B.12 in Appendix
B.2 contains the impulse responses, which closely track those in the benchmark
specification.
2.6.5 Alternative Forecasting Horizons
In our benchmark analysis we arbitrarily fixed the forecasting horizon to be
one quarter, h = 1, in regression equation (2.3). We now extend our analysis by
considering alternative forecasting horizons. In particular, we consider the cases of
38A potential shortcoming that this detrending measure poses is the fact that it is a two-sided
filter and thus may display less accuracy when extracting the trend component in the end points of
any time series. This may be particularly inconvenient in this case, given that our objective is to
study the information content within a forecasting regression framework. We try to minimize this
problem by using out-of-sample observations on the variables used for the period 2013.Q3-2014.Q4.
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h = 0, 2, 3, 4. The case of h = 0 is one of “nowcasting” and can be thought as one
where, because of reporting lags, economists typically do not observe current output
growth, while financial asset prices that are used to construct EFI may be readily
available.
The results of these alternative forecasting horizons are presented in the lower
panel of Table 2.4. For comparison, the first column reports the results in our
benchmark case where h = 1 and the other columns present, respectively, the cases
of h = 2, 3, 4, and 0. In all cases, the specification presented is the one with all
controls active (Spec. 5 from Table 2.2).
The coefficient associated with ∆EFI increases in size (and statistical signif-
icance) as h increases above 1, although not monotonically. The highest value, in
absolute terms, is found for h = 3, in which case γ̂ = −0.000034, a 55 percent in-
crease relative to the one found in our benchmark case, and statistically, significant
at 1 percent. The opposite occurs for the nowcast specification, where the coefficient
reduces roughly to half of that in the benchmark specification, and is no longer sig-
nificant at 10 percent. These results highlight the forecasting information content
of EFI for economic activity in emerging economies. They are also in line with the
serial correlations presented in Figure 2.3, which showed the strongest comovement
between contemporaneous economic activity and lagged values of EFI in all the
EMEs considered.39
39In terms of the controls, the U.S. yield curve loses its significance at longer lags, unlike the real
Federal Fund rate ,which continues to be significant for h ≥ 1, but not at h = 0. The coefficient
on the Federal Funds rate also increases in magnitude until h = 3. The coefficient on the real
local rate appears to be significant only at 10 percent when h = 3 and with a positive sign, which
would signal that domestic monetary policy behaves in a countercyclical and forward-looking way.
Finally, the coefficient on real commodity prices is strongest and statistically significant when h = 0
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Table 2.4: Alternative Filtering Method and Forecasting Horizons
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
Panel A. Alternative filter
∆GDP ct 0.74
∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(24.94) (25.86) (26.07) (13.63) (15.66)
EFIct -0.000027
∗∗ -0.000025∗∗ -0.000026∗∗ -0.000021∗ -0.000019∗
(-2.93) (-2.84) (-3.11) (-2.27) (-2.29)











Adjusted R2 0.675 0.688 0.677 0.686 0.701
Observations 399 399 399 399 399
Panel B. Alternative forecasting horizon





∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.063 -0.24∗∗
(21.42) (7.18) (0.81) (-2.68)
∆EFIt -0.000022
∗∗ -0.000032∗∗∗ -0.000034∗∗∗ -0.000024∗∗ -0.000013
(-2.97) (-3.88) (-4.24) (-2.74) (-1.60)
∆US Y ieldCurvet 0.0032
∗∗ 0.0042∗ 0.0027 -0.00054 0.0011
(2.66) (2.41) (1.48) (-0.29) (0.88)
∆RFFt 0.0026
∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ -0.00024
(2.67) (3.76) (5.71) (5.57) (-0.41)
∆RLocal Ratet 0.00046 0.00100 0.00092
∗ 0.00056 0.00041
(0.86) (1.54) (2.19) (0.95) (0.79)
∆RPcomt 0.015
∗ 0.020∗ 0.014 0.012 0.028∗∗
(2.44) (2.29) (1.66) (1.29) (3.46)
Adjusted R2 0.718 0.449 0.360 0.328 0.721
Observations 371 371 371 371 371
Notes: This table shows two robustness checks. Panel A reproduces results in Table 2.2 using
an alternative filter (Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600; a superscript c
represents the cyclical component of the filtered series). Panel B reproduces Spec. 5 in Table 2.2
for different forecasting horizons where the dependent variables are ∆GDPt+h and h is a forecasting
horizon. In Panel B, all variables are identically defined as in Table 2.2. Numbers in parentheses are
t-statistics adjusted for standard errors clustered by country. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent
level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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2.6.6 Alternative Lag Order
In the benchmark SVAR characterized in equation (2.4) we arbitrarily set the
number of lags to be one, p = 1. We now consider alternative lag specifications.40
The upper left plot in Figure 2.7 reports the impulse responses of output growth for
the alternative cases when p = 2, 3. For comparison, we also report the responses in
the benchmark case. Solid lines represent impulses that are statistically significant
at the 95 percent confidence level.
The results are qualitatively identical to the benchmark case. An orthogonal
one S.D. shock to ∆EFI leads to a protracted fall in economic activity for all lag
specifications considered. The trough also continues to lie one year after the shock.
Quantitatively, the depth of the trough is 0.55 percent, slightly lower in magnitude
than that in the benchmark case where the trough is around 0.75 percent.41
2.6.7 Alternative Identification Scheme
As argued before, the identification assumption used in the SVAR model—
that shocks to ∆EFI affect output growth only with a lag while shocks to output
may impact ∆EFI contemporaneously—has been common in the literature on both
developed economies and EMEs. Nonetheless, we test the robustness of our results
to an opposite timing/identification assumption where shocks to ∆EFI can affect
and then decreases in magnitude and statistical significance as the forecast horizon increases.
40Table B.5 in Appendix B.2 contains also extensions of the forecasting panel regression (2.3)
with additional lags.
41Because the specification changes in these two alternatives, the size of the S.D. of the shock
to ∆EFI also varies slightly. The shock has a magnitude of 147 and 142 basis points for the cases
where p = 2,3, respectively.
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Figure 2.7: Various Robustness Checks
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Notes: This figure presents different robustness checks to our baseline results. The top left panel
presents impulse response functions of annual real GDP growth rate to a 1 standard deviation shock
to ∆EFI for two different lag order specifications (p = 2 and p = 3). Solid lines represent statistically
significant responses at the 95% confidence level. The top right panel presents the impulse response
function of the bivariate panel VAR with ∆EFI and ∆GDP with an alternative ordering in the
Cholesky decomposition so that ∆EFI affects ∆GDP contemporaneously but not vice-versa. The
middle left panel presents the p-value of the coefficients corresponding to ∆EFI from rolling panel
regressions for the five specifications in Table 2.2 (starting in 1999.Q2 through 2007.Q4 and adding
one quarter at a time). The middle right panel presents the estimated coefficients of ∆EFI from
these rolling regressions. The lower panel presents the impulse response function of the benchmark
bivariate panel VAR with ∆GDP and ∆EFI, where EFI is calculated after excluding bonds issued
by financial firms.
129
output growth contemporaneously, but not vice-versa.
The results of this alternative identifying assumption are reported in the upper
right plot of Figure 2.7. The plot reports the point estimates of the impulse response
of output growth from a one S.D. shock to ∆EFI under the new identification
scheme, along with its 95 percent confidence bands. For comparison, we also include
the point estimate of the impulse responses in the benchmark case. The results are
robust. On impact, there is a small drop in output growth of about 0.1 percentage
point, although not statistically different from zero. The fall, however, continues
until it bottoms after a year when output growth falls by 0.8 percentage points.
The persistence of the shock on real economic activity is also similar, as output
growth returns to its long-run mean around three years after the initial shock.
2.6.8 The Role of the World Financial Crisis and Subsequent Recov-
ery
The stylized facts presented in Section 2.3 showed that, while the increasing
trend of international debt securities started in the early 2000s, the trend accelerated
most vigorously during the post-crisis recovery that began in mid-2009. Moreover,
the time series of economic activity and EFI presented in Figure 2.3 show that the
negative comovement between the two is most evident during the world financial
crisis of 2008/9 and the subsequent recovery years. In this subsection we investigate
how much the post-2008 period matters for our benchmark results. To do so we
re-estimate regression equation (2.3) from the beginning of our sample, 1999.Q2,
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until 2007.Q4, three quarters prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We then
sequentially reestimate regression equation (2.3) by adding to the sample one more
observation at a time while keeping the starting period fixed at 1999.Q2. For each
case we document the estimated values and p-values of γ, the coefficient that links
∆EFI with future states of economic activity.
Results of this experiment are reported in the left and right middle panels
of Figure 2.7. The left plot reports the recursive p-value statistics for each of the
five specifications considered in Table 2.2. Four of the five coefficients considered
are statistically significant in the first period considered up to 2007.Q4, and all five
exhibit a decreasing trend in the p-values as new observations are added. Like-
wise, the right plot with the estimated γ coefficients for shows that as data of the
crisis and the post-recovery are added, the negative coefficient increases in abso-
lute terms.42 We view this as indicating that the crisis and, more importantly, the
post-recovery period account for most of the information content of EFI for future
economic activity in emerging economies, although there is evidence that some of
the predictive power predates the crisis. We posit that this result is a consequence
of the large expansion in corporate bond issuance that began before the financial
crisis, but accelerated afterwards, as documented in Section 2.3.
42The decrease in the p-values is, however, not monotonic for Specs. 2 and 5, which control
for U.S. interest rates and monetary policy stance. In particular, the p-values increase between
2008.Q3 and 2009.Q3. One also observes that, for this period, the decrease in the estimated
coefficients of γ slows down. This coincides with the most turbulent times of the financial crisis
and the active use of monetary policy. The results seem to point that, for these two quarters,
EFI ′s information content decreased in favor of the information already embedded in the U.S.
interest rates.
131
2.6.9 Removing Financial Corporations’ Bonds
We now assess the extent to which the high information content in EFI comes
from bonds issued by non-financial corporates in EMEs. For that purpose we test
whether our results hold if we remove from the construction of the EFI the bonds
issued by financial corporations in each of the seven EMEs considered, using the
methodology described in equations (2.1) and (2.2). This entails removing roughly
half of the total number of bonds considered in the construction of the benchmark
EFI.43 With this modified EFI we re-run the panel SVAR model (2.4) and compare
the new impulse responses of output growth to those from the benchmark case.
Results are reported in the lower plot in Figure 2.7. They are virtually identical
to those coming from the benchmark case. There continues to be a large and pro-
tracted fall in economic activity following an orthogonal one S.D. shock to changes
in the modified EFI. We view this as complementary to the evidence discussed in
Section 2.3 that a considerable part of the rise in external bond issuance in emerging
economies has been channeled via the corporate non-financial sector.
2.6.10 Excluding Countries
How much are the benchmark results driven by one of the EMEs considered?
We assess this by redoing the panel forecasting regression equation (2.3) excluding
each of the seven countries considered, one at a time.
43Among the total of 2,339 bonds considered in the benchmark case, 1,206 are bonds issued by
banks or other financial institutions. Figure B.8 in Appendix B.2 plots the evolution in time of
the size of the financial bonds that we remove for this experiment.
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The results are presented in Table 2.5, which reports the coefficients from
estimating Specification 5 in Table 2.2, sequentially excluding each of the seven
EMEs considered one at a time. Qualitatively, the results are robust for each of
the seven cases/columns considered. In all of them the estimated coefficient of γ
continues to be statistically significant and of similar magnitude to the one estimated
in our benchmark case. Our results are therefore not driven by an outlier country
in the sample.44
2.7 Concluding Remarks
Access to world capital markets by the corporate sector may be viewed as a
necessary condition for emerging economies to achieve sustainable long-run growth.
But it can also entail the risk that changes in the financial conditions under which
the private sector borrows in these markets may carry destabilizing consequences
for real economic activity. These considerations are more pressing now than ever
because the corporate sectors of many emerging markets have greatly increased their
reliance on foreign debt.
Motivated by this observation, we have provided a comprehensive analysis that
sheds light on the extent to which changes in the international financing conditions
firms facing in the corporate sector in emerging economies are related to macroe-
conomic fluctuations. We do so first by providing a summary of the theoretical
literature that postulates the channels through which such economic effects may oc-
44Figure B.13 and Table B.4 in Appendix B.2 also reports the results for cases where the SVAR





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cur. We then provide empirical evidence of recent increases in international credit
access using information for a pool of 17 emerging economies. In particular, we doc-
ument increases in corporate bond issuance denominated in USD. We relied on this
stylized fact to construct an indicator of external financial conditions for several of
these economies using option-adjusted spreads from bonds issued in foreign capital
markets by the corporate sector that are traded in secondary markets. We show
that changes in this indicator are strongly correlated with future economic activity
in EMEs and that identified shocks to the indicator entail large and protracted falls
in economic activity.
While we have been silent about the policy implications of our analysis, the
results we have presented do warrant a more normative analysis of the extent to
which policy actions can (or should try to) mitigate the effects that changes in
foreign financing conditions of the corporate sector may have on economic activity
in EMEs. The large increase in the stock of foreign debt in the balance sheet of
EMEs’ corporates will certainly keep this question at the forefront of international
macroeconomics for the years to come. Hopefully the results in this paper will
motivate further work to shed light on this question.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 TFP Estimation
In this section of the appendix, I provide details of how variables used in
the TFP estimation are constructed. I heavily follow Covas and Den Haan (2011)
and Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014) in cleaning data and defining variables. All
balance sheet variables are from Compustat. Capital letters in parentheses represent
Compustat mnemonics. Financial and utility firms (SIC 4900-4949 and 6000-6999,
NAICS 22 and 52-53) are deleted from the sample, which is a standard procedure
in the literature. I further drop postal service, courier and messengers, and the
warehousing and storage industry (NAICS 49), since less than 250 observations are
available for the entire sample period. Firms belonging to an unclassified industry
(NAICS 99) are dropped from the sample.
Firm-year observations with non-positive total assets (AT), total sales (SALE),
operating income before depreciation and amortization (OIBDP), number of em-
ployees(EMP), gross property, plant, and equipment (PPEGT), or net property,
plant, and equipment (PPENT) are dropped from the sample. These variables are
necessary inputs to construct variables used in the TFP regression.
To ensure data reliability, firm-year observations violating the accounting iden-
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tity (total assets equals total liabilites plus stockholders’ equity) by more than 10%
are dropped from the sample.
Observations with a fiscal year ending between April and August are dropped
from the sample in order to minimize calendar and fiscal year mismatch.
Value-added (V Ai,j,t)is defined as total sales (SALE) net of materials. Materi-
als are defined as total expenses minus labor expenses. Total expenses are measured
as total sales (SALE) minus operating income before depreciation and amortization
(OIBDP), and labor expenses are defined as the number of employees (EMP) times
the industry-level average annual wage. I mostly use 2-digit NAICS-level indus-
try wages. I use 3- or 4-digit industry level wages if available. The source of the
average annual wage data is the Bureau of Labor Statistics [link]. I mostly use a 2-
digit NAICS level value-added price deflator to calculate real values of value-added.
However I use 3- or 4-digit industry level if available. The source of the value-added
price deflators is the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The number of employees, Li,j,t
is directly available from Compustat (EMP).
I define the stock of capital Ki,j,t as lagged net property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT). However, measuring the real capital stock is not straightforward since
investments are made at different points of time. To address this issue, I calculate an
average age of capital, and deflate the capital stock accordingly using an aggregate
non-residential fixed investment deflator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
which can easily be downloaded from Federal Reserve Economic Data.1 For example,
1Although Bureau of Labor Statics provides [link] an investment good deflator at 2- and 3-digit
NAICS level, the series starts only in 1990. Since the stock of capital is built by a sequence of
investment over time, it is necessary to know the price deflator of investment goods purchased
prior to 1990, unless all investments are made after 1990. For the reason, using an industry level
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if a firm’s average age of capital in 2000 is 3 years, I deflate net property, plant, and
equipment (PPENT) using its deflator in 1997. Average age of capital is defined as
a 3-year moving average of accumulated depreciation (DPACT) divided by current
depreciation (DP).
Intermediate inputs are defined as materials, which are defined above. I mostly
use 2-digit NAICS level industry intermediate input price deflators. However I use
3- or 4-digit industry level data if available. The source of data is the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
The TFP estimation yields a total of 68,964 firm-year TFP observations for 8,500
unique firms (which is approximately 85% of the sample included in the main re-
gression.) Note that this is not identical to the number of firm-year observations
and unique firms which are used to estimate equation (1.16). There are fewer obser-
vations available for the variables required for the TFP regression than for the main
regression. I do not necessarily require observations included in the main regression
to be included in the TFP regression. This procedure maximizes the number of
observations for the main regression.
A.2 Variable Definition
On variable definitions and firms included in the main regression sample, I
mostly follow Covas and Den Haan (2011). Capital letters in parenthesis represent
Compustat mnemonics. Financial and utility firms (SIC 4900-4949 and 6000-6999,
NAICS 22 and 52-53) are deleted from the sample, which is a standard procedure
deflator of investment causes a substantial loss of observations.
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in the literature. I further drop postal service, courier and messengers, and ware-
housing and storage (NAICS 49), since less than 250 observations are available for
the entire sample period. Firms belonging to an unclassified industry (NAICS 99)
are dropped from the sample.
Firm-year observations with negative total liabilities (LT), long-term debt
(DLTT), debt in current liabilities (DLC), stock price (PRCC F), liquidating value
of preferred stock (PSTKL), dividends to preferred stock (DVP), sales of com-
mon and preferred stocks (SSTK), and purchases of common and preferred stocks
(PRSTKC) are dropped from the sample. Firm-year observations with non-positive
stockholders’ equity (SEQ) are dropped from the sample.
If firms are involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB), they are
excluded from the sample. GM, GE, Ford, and Chrysler are dropped from the sample
since they are substantially affected by accounting changes in 1988. If a firm-year
observation violates the accounting identity (total assets (AT) equals total liabilites
(LT) plus stockholders’ equity(SEQ)) by more than 10%, it is dropped from the
sample. Firm-year observations with stockholders’ equity (SEQ)-to-total asset (AT)
ratio below 0.01 or total debt-to-total asset (AT) ratio greater than 1 are dropped
from the sample. Total debt is defined as the sum of debt in current liabilities
(DLC) and long-term debt (DLTT). This restriction is to exclude firms which are
virtually bankrupt, or in substantial financial distress. Lastly, observations with
a fiscal year ending in between April and August are dropped from the sample in
order to minimize calendar and fiscal year mismatch.
The definitions of firm level balance sheet variables are as follows (Items in
139
double quotation marks refer to variable names in the Compustat manual. All
variables are deflated by the U.S. CPI):
• Equity financet: “Sale of Common and Preferred Stock (SSTK)” mi-
nus “Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock (PRSTKC)” divided
by lagged “Assets - Total (AT)”
• Debt financei,t: Changes in total debt divided by lagged “Assets - Total
(AT)” where total debt is “Debt in Current Liabilities - Total (DLC)”
plus ”Long-Term Debt - Total (DLTT)”
• Leveragei,t: Total debt divided by lagged “Assets - Total (AT)” where total
debt is “Debt in Current Liabilities - Total (DLC)” plus ”Long-Term
Debt - Total (DLTT)”
• Cashflowi,t: “Income Before Extraordinary Items (IB)” minus “Depreciation
and Amortization (DP)” divided by lagged “Assets - Total (AT)”
• Tobin′sQi,t: “Common Shares Outstanding (CSHO)” times “Price Close
- Annual - Fiscal (PRCC F)” plus “Preferred Stock - Liquidating
Value (PSTKL)” plus “Dividends - Preferred/Preference(DVP)” plus
‘‘Liabilities - Total (LT)” divided by lagged “Assets - Total (AT)”
• Sales growth ratei,t: “Sales/Turnover (Net) (SALE)” minus lagged “Sales/Turnover
(Net)” divided by lagged “Assets - Total (AT)”
• Asset growth ratei,t: “Assets - Total (AT)” minus lagged “Assets - Total
(AT)” divided by lagged “Assets - Total (AT)”
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• firm sizei,t: log of lagged “Assets - Total (AT)”
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Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Data Sources and Definitions
B.1.1 Description of Bonds from Dealogic’s DCM Database and Def-
inition of International and Domestic Debt Securities
The bond issuance data used in this paper are sourced from Dealogic DCM
database. The figures show country aggregations of transaction-level data. The
database includes a total of 625,074 bond tranches (479,678 unique bond deals).
The totals shown in Figures B.2-B.5 and B.6-B.7 of the Appendix are aggregations
for all non-government bonds for the 17 countries in the sample (a total of 13,287
bond tranches). The figures include issuance of government-owned companies (such
as utilities, oil companies, universities, and transport systems).
The definition of an international debt security (IDS) used in the paper follows
the new methodology implemented by the Bank for International Settlements to
define international debt securities. This methodology compares the location where
the bond is issued with the residence of the issuer. Following the BIS’ practice,
the place of residence of a firm is considered to be the jurisdiction where it is
incorporated. To identify the place where the bond is issued we use information
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on the country where the security (or securities as a bond may be composed of
multiple individual securities) is listed, the ISIN number (or numbers) assigned to
the security (or securities), and the governing law.
A bond is classified as an IDS if it is listed in multiple countries, or if it is
listed with an international central depository, or if it includes securities that have
been issued ISIN numbers in multiple countries. A security is also considered an
IDS if the residence of the issuer is different from the country where the security
is issued an ISIN, or if it is different from the security’s governing law. Bonds
with incomplete information on listing place, ISIN number, and governing laws are
classified as international securities if the data provider classifies the bond as foreign
by market type.
Similar rules are applied to classify a security as domestic for cases in which
the residence of the issuer is the same as the governing law, or the same as the
ISIN nationality, or the same as the listing place, or all three conditions apply at
once (and given no contradiction with classification as international security, and a
unique listing place and/or unique ISIN nationality). Given lack of information on
ISIN number, listing place, and governing law, the bond is classified as domestic if
the vendor designated by Dealogic is domestic by market type.




We use data on option-adjusted spreads from Bloomberg. We specifically used
the mnemonic OAS SPREAD BID to retrieve quarterly spreads for all corporate bonds
with available OAS data in Bloomberg for the seven countries in our sample. The
Bloomberg tickers of the bonds in our sample are available upon request.
B.1.3 Other data
We use data on outstanding stocks of international and domestic debt se-
curities from the BIS’ Securities Database. We also employ data on cross-border
loans from the BIS’ Locational Banking Statistics database. For GDP data we col-
lected data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. We also
used data on sovereign debt held by private banks for five Latin American coun-
tries, sourced from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) LAC Debt Group
database. Data used in the panel regressions and SVAR models are from Fernández
et al. (2015a) (domestic GDP, consumption and investment; U.S. yields, interest
rates, and GDP growth; and commodity prices; see that paper for more details).
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B.2 Additional Figures and Tables
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This figure is a replication of Figure 2.1 measuring the stock of securities on a residence basis, rather
than on a nationality basis. As in Figure 2.1, the figure shows the aggregate stock of private sector
international debt for 17 emerging economies, decomposing the outstanding stock into cross-border
bank loans and international debt securities. The private sector includes all financial institutions
and non-financial corporations. The regional aggregations are as follows: East Asia and Pacific:
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. East Europe and Central Asia: Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and Peru. Other Regions: South Africa, and Israel. The data are presented in billions of current
U.S. dollars and sourced from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics and BIS Securities Statistics
databases.
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Notes: This figure presents country dissaggregations of the stocks of international debt shown by
region in Figure 2.1. As in Figure 2.1, this figure shows the aggregate stock of private sector
international debt for 17 emerging economies, decomposing the outstanding stock into cross-border
bank loans and international debt securities. The stock of securities is on a nationality basis.
The private sector includes all financial institutions and non-financial corporations. The regional
aggregations are as follows: East Asia and Pacific: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and
Thailand. East Europe and Central Asia: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey.
Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Other Regions: South Africa and Israel.
The data are presented in billions of current U.S. dollars and sourced from the BIS Locational
Banking Statistics and BIS Securities Statistics databases.146
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Notes: This figure presents regional aggregates of country-by-country gross issuance shown in Fig-
ure 2.2. As in Figure 2.2, this figure shows gross issuance of international and domestic debt
securities based on a nationality basis. The regional aggregations are as follows: East Asia and Pa-
cific: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. East Europe and Central Asia: Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and Peru. Other Regions: South Africa and Israel. The data are presented in billions of current
U.S. dollars and sourced from Dealogic’s DCM database. See Appendix B.1 for a description of how
country aggregates are obtained from transaction-level data and for a definition of international and
domestic debt securities.
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Notes: This figure reproduces regional aggregates of gross issuance shown in Figure B.3, but on a
residence basis. As in Figure B.3, the regional aggregations are as follows: East Asia and Pacific:
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. East Europe and Central Asia: Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and Peru. Other Regions: South Africa and Israel. The data are presented in billions of current
U.S. dollars and sourced from Dealogic’s DCM database. See Appendix B.1 for a description of how
country aggregates are obtained from transaction-level data and for a definition of international and
domestic debt securities.
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Notes: This figure shows the aggregate stock of sovereign debt in 17 emerging economies, decompos-
ing the outstanding stock into international and domestic debt securities. The quarterly stocks are
scaled by annual GDP (i.e., the sum of last 4 quarters). Data on stocks are from the BIS Securities
Statistics database and data on GDP are from the IMF International Financial Statistics Database.
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Notes: This figure shows gross issuance of international and domestic debt securities by region based
on a nationality basis, as in Figure B.3, further decomposing issuance by issuer into non-financial
and financial corporations. Financial corporations include issuance by any firm classified by the
data vendor as operating in the “Finance” and “Insurance” sectors, and issuance by Closed End
funds and Holding Companies. The regional aggregations are as follows: East Asia and Pacific:
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. East Europe and Central Asia: Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and Peru. Other Regions: South Africa, and Israel. The data are presented in billions of current
U.S. dollars and sourced from Dealogic’s DCM database. See Appendix B.1 for a description of how
country aggregates are obtained from transaction-level data and for a definition of international and
domestic debt securities.
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Notes: This figure shows gross issuance of international and domestic debt securities by country
based on a nationality basis, as in Figure B.3, but scaling it by GDP. Data on quarterly gross issuance
are scaled by annual GDP (i.e., the sum of last 4 quarters). Data on gross issuance are soured from
Dealotic’s DCM database and data on GDP are from the IMF International Financial Statistics
Database. The regional aggregations are as follows: East Asia and Pacific: Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. East Europe and Central Asia: Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Russia, and Turkey. Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Other
Regions: South Africa, and Israel.
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Figure B.8: The Size of Non-financial and Financial Bonds
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Notes: This figure shows the sum of the size of sample bonds (in 2003 Billion USD) used in construct-
ing EFI, at a given quarter. The black solid line represents sum of both financial and non-financial
bonds. The black dotted line only includes non-financial bonds (left-axis). The red solid line with tri-
angles represents the fraction (right-axis) of non-financial bonds to total bonds. The top left panel
represents aggregated statistics across countries, and other panels represents country-by-country
statistics. As noted in Footnote 24, these figures show that the subsample of bonds with OAS data
used in the paper is representative of the universe of bonds studied in Section 2.3 insofar as they
depict a large increase in issuance after the 2008/2009 crisis.
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Figure B.9: IRF and FEVD from the Uribe-Yue panel VAR
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Notes: This figure summarizes impulse response functions and forecast error variance de-
compositions of a panel VAR model as in Uribe and Yue (2006). This model includes
{∆GDPi,t, ∆Invi,t, ∆TradeBalancei,t, ∆EFIi,t} as endogenous variables, and {∆RFFt} as an
exogenous variable. The top row presents an impulse response function of year-on-year real GDP,
and investment growth rate to a 1 standard deviation shock in ∆EFI. Red dotted lines represent
95% confidence interval calculated using 500 draws of Monte Carlo simulations. The bottom row
summarizes forecast error decompositions of real GDP and investment growth rates. Green-triangle
dotted lines represent results from Figure 2.4. Data for Malaysia starts in 2005.Q1 due to lack of
investment data.
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Figure B.10: Impulse Response Controlling for Sovereign and External Risk (Alter-
native Identifying Assumption)
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Notes: This figure reproduces results in Figure 2.6 with an alternative ordering in the Cholesky
decomposition; ∆EMBI responds to ∆EFI only in lags. The first column shows results from a
trivariate panel VAR model which includes {∆GDPi,t,∆EFIi,t,∆EMBIi,t} as endogenous vari-
ables. The second column shows results from a trivariate panel VAR model which includes
{∆GDPi,t,∆EFIi,t,∆EMBIi,t} as endogenous variables, and {∆V IXt} as an exogenous variable.
The top row presents an impulse response function of year-on-year real GDP to a 1 standard de-
viation shock in ∆EFI. Red dotted lines represent 95% confidence interval calculated using 500
draws of Monte Carlo simulations. The bottom row presents forecast error decomposition of real
GDP associated with ∆EFI shocks. Green-triangle dotted lines represent results from Figure 2.4.
Korea is excluded due to EMBI data availability. 1999.Q2 EMBI observation for Chile is dropped
due to EMBI data availability.
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Figure B.11: Alternative Panel VAR
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Notes: This figure summarizes impulse response functions and forecast error variance decomposition
of the following panel VAR model which includes {∆GDPi,t,∆INVi,t,∆TBi,t,∆EMBIi,t,∆EFIi,t}
as endogenous variables, and {∆RFFt,∆V IXt} as exogenous variables. The top row presents an
impulse response function of year-on-year real GDP, and investment growth rate to a 1 standard
deviation shock in ∆EFI. Red dotted lines represent 95% confidence interval calculated using
500 draws of Monte Carlo simulations. The bottom row presents forecast error decomposition of
real GDP and investment growth rates. Malaysian sample starts in 2005.Q1 due to investment
data availability. Korea is excluded due to EMBI data availability. Green-triangle dotted lines
represent results from Figure 2.4. 1999.Q2 EMBI observation for Chile is dropped due to EMBI
data availability.
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Figure B.12: IRF and FEVD with Benchmark Bi-variate Panel VAR with HP-
filtered Variables
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Notes: The two panels reproduce results from Figure 2.4 replacing ∆EFI and GDP growth rate
with EFIc and ∆GDP c respectively. The superscript c refers to variables filtered using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. The left panel presents impulse response func-
tions of RGDP c to a 1 standard deviation shock in EFIc. The right panel presents a forecast error
variance decomposition of real GDP growth rate. Green-triangle dotted lines represent results from
Figure 2.4.
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Figure B.13: Country-Specific Forecasting Regressions and SVAR


















































Notes: This figure summarizes impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions
of the benchmark bivariate model estimated country by country. The plot on the left presents impulse
response functions of year-on-year real GDP growth rate to a 1 standard deviation shock in ∆EFI.
Solid lines represent the portion of the IRF that is significant portion at the 95% confidence level.
The plot on the right panel row presents the fraction of forecast error variance of real GDP growth
rate due to ∆EFI.
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Table B.1: Share of International Loans to Sovereigns in Total International Bank
Loans to EMEs
Year Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
2006 5.21 0.00 1.74 0.00 0.01
2007 3.04 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.01
2008 2.77 0.00 1.49 0.00 0.44
2009 2.85 0.00 2.24 0.00 0.41
2010 1.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24
2011 1.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16
2012 1.53 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.11
2013 1.37 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.10
2014 1.06 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.08
Notes: This table shows the share of international loans to governments as percentage of all cross-
border bank loans to the country for five emerging countries. Data on international bank loans to
sovereigns are sourced from the LAC Debt Group Standardized Public Debt Database of the IDB
and refer to the stock of outstanding bank loans under external legislation. Data on all cross-border
bank loans are from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics and refer to stock of outstanding bank

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.3: Anderson-Hsiao Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
∆GDPt 0.20
∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.00046 0.10
(4.02) (2.04) (3.66) (0.00) (0.98)
∆EFIt -0.000026
∗∗∗ -0.000025∗∗ -0.000026∗∗∗ -0.000017∗ -0.000016∗
(-2.66) (-2.53) (-2.62) (-1.84) (-1.81)









Adjusted R2 0.168 0.169 0.167 0.189 0.223
Observations 357 357 357 357 357
Notes: This table reproduces the baseline results of Table 2.2 using the Anderson-Hsiao estimator to
address potential inconsistency of a LSDV estimator in a dynamic panel with fixed effects. Numbers
in parentheses are t-statistics adjusted for standard errors clustered by country. ∗ indicates signifi-
cance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.5: Panel Regression Results with Varying Number of Lagged Dependent
Variables
p=0 p=1 p=2 p=3
∆GDPt 0.75
∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗










∗∗ -0.000014∗∗ -0.000013∗∗ -0.000013∗∗
(-2.97) (-2.86) (-2.92) (-3.09)
∆US Y ieldCurvet 0.0032
∗∗ 0.0016 0.0013 0.0013
(2.66) (1.57) (1.32) (1.35)
∆RFFt 0.0026
∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ 0.0020∗∗
(2.67) (2.82) (3.10) (3.13)
∆RLocal Ratet 0.00046 0.00029 0.00024 0.00028
(0.86) (0.77) (0.65) (0.73)
∆RPcomt 0.015
∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(2.44) (2.66) (2.65) (2.78)
Adjusted R2 0.718 0.754 0.758 0.761
Observations 371 371 371 371
Notes: This table reproduces Spec (5) in Table 2.2 for alternatives values of p (the number of lags of
∆GDP ). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics adjusted for standard errors clustered by country. ∗
indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates
significance at 1 percent level.
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Table B.6: Panel Regression Results with Time Fixed Effect and Crisis Dummy
Variable
Spec 5 Spec 6 Spec 7 Spec 8 Spec 9 Spec 10
∆GDPt 0.75∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(21.42) (17.27) (18.08) (17.08) (16.17) (16.89)
∆EFIt -0.000022∗∗ -0.000021∗∗ -0.000018∗∗ -0.0000062 -0.0000062 -0.0000061
(-2.97) (-2.82) (-2.77) (-1.24) (-1.18) (-1.01)
∆US Y ieldCurvet 0.0032∗∗ 0.0037∗∗ 0.0038∗∗
(2.66) (2.73) (2.85)
∆RFFt 0.0026∗∗ 0.0027∗∗ 0.0026∗∗
(2.67) (2.62) (2.62)
∆RLocal Ratet 0.00046 0.00048 0.00044 -0.000023
(0.86) (0.89) (0.86) (-0.04)
∆RPcomt 0.015∗ 0.014∗ 0.012∗ -0.00017
(2.44) (2.20) (2.18) (-0.02)
US∆GDPt 0.076 0.031
(1.31) (0.53)
Adjusted R2 0.718 0.719 0.736 0.820 0.804 0.803
Observations 371 371 371 371 371 371
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Crisis dummy No No Yes - - -
Time fixed effect No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports panel forecasting regression results with time fixed effect or a crisis dummy
variable (1 if 2008.Q4, and 0 otherwise). The first column reports a baseline result (last column
of Table 2.2). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics adjusted for standard errors clustered by
country. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and
∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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Table B.7: Panel Regression Results with Time Fixed Effect and Crisis Dummy
Variable and Alternative Forecasting Horizons
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=0
∆GDPt+1 ∆GDPt+2 ∆GDPt+3 ∆GDPt+4 ∆GDPt
∆GDPt−1 0.73∗∗∗
(14.57)
∆GDPt 0.74∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.19∗ -0.018
(16.89) (6.84) (2.42) (-0.19)
∆EFIt -0.0000061 -0.0000098∗ -0.000013∗∗∗ -0.000011 0.0000023
(-1.01) (-2.35) (-4.22) (-1.58) (0.55)
∆RLocal Ratet -0.000023 0.000065 0.0000088 -0.000027 -0.000040
(-0.04) (0.10) (0.02) (-0.08) (-0.08)
∆RPcomt -0.00017 0.011 0.026 0.029∗ -0.0083
(-0.02) (0.85) (1.69) (1.98) (-1.22)
Adjusted R2 0.803 0.654 0.612 0.607 0.801
Observations 371 371 371 371 371
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reproduces the bottom panel of Table 2.4 (panel forecasting regression for different
forecasting horizons h) including both time and country fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are
t-statistics adjusted for standard errors clustered by country. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent
level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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B.3 Controlling for Sovereign Risk with a Principal Component Anal-
ysis
As an alternative approach, we control for sovereign risk using a principal com-
ponent analysis. First, we calculate principal components of ∆EFI and ∆EMBI
at a country level. We assume that the first principal component denoted by PCk,t
for country k measures the common component affecting ∆EFI and ∆EMBI. We
further construct new variables ∆EFIpck,t ≡ ∆EFIk,t − PCk,t and ∆EMBI
pc
k,t ≡
∆EMBIk,t−PCk,t. In this framework, ∆EFIpck,t captures the variation in ∆EFIk,t
which is independent from the sovereign risk.
The results of the regression are reported in the upper panel of Table B.8,
where we reproduce the same five specifications of Table 2.3 while replacing ∆EFI
and ∆EMBI with ∆EFIpc, ∆EMBIpc, and PC. The coefficient associated with
∆EFIpc continues to be negative, large in absolute value, and statistically significant
at 5 percent.
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Table B.8: Principal Component
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
Panel A. Controlling for sovereign risk (Principal Component)
RGDP growtht 0.76
∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(27.38) (21.54) (29.17) (11.42) (16.83)
∆EFIpct -0.000035
∗∗ -0.000035∗∗ -0.000034∗∗ -0.000028∗∗ -0.000027∗∗∗
(-2.99) (-3.98) (-2.88) (-3.08) (-4.34)
∆EMBIpct 0.0000078 0.000011 0.0000079 0.0000097 0.000013
(0.48) (0.77) (0.48) (0.64) (1.05)
PCt -0.000025
∗ -0.000023∗ -0.000025∗ -0.000018 -0.000016
(-2.15) (-2.18) (-2.24) (-1.68) (-1.69)











Adjusted R2 0.685 0.703 0.689 0.703 0.725
Observations 317 317 317 317 317
Panel B. Controlling for foreign investors’ risk aversion (Principal Component)
RGDP growtht 0.72
∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(15.35) (17.42) (16.21) (9.92) (13.62)
∆EFIpct -0.000019
∗∗∗ -0.000020∗∗∗ -0.000019∗∗∗ -0.000017∗∗∗ -0.000018∗∗∗
(-5.86) (-8.42) (-5.73) (-5.39) (-6.11)
∆EMBIpct 0.0000100 0.000013
∗ 0.0000099 0.000011 0.000014∗
(1.34) (2.39) (1.21) (1.29) (2.10)
PCt -0.0000091 -0.0000078 -0.0000097 -0.0000075 -0.0000065
(-1.28) (-1.42) (-1.30) (-1.00) (-0.99)
∆V IXt -0.00053
∗∗ -0.00050∗∗∗ -0.00050∗∗ -0.00042∗∗ -0.00037∗∗
(-3.70) (-4.18) (-3.60) (-2.68) (-2.65)











Adjusted R2 0.708 0.724 0.710 0.716 0.735
Observations 317 317 317 317 317
Notes: This table reproduces the Table 2.3 replacing ∆EFI and ∆EMBI with ∆EFIpc,
∆EMBIpc, and PC. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics adjusted for standard errors clus-
tered by country. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent
level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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